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ABSTRACT. Early scholarship on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines focused on the transfer
of sentencing authority from judges to the Sentencing Commission; later studies examined the
transfer of discretion from judges to prosecutors. Of equal significance are two other
institutional competitions for power: one between local federal prosecutors and officials in the
Department of Justice in Washington ("Main Justice"), and the other between Congress and the
Supreme Court. Congress's enactment of the Feeney Amendment in 2003, in reaction to
sentencing data and decisions appearing to reveal that sentencing judges were willfully ignoring
the Guidelines, represented a direct challenge to every level of the federal judiciary, to the
Sentencing Commission, and to front-line federal prosecutors. By design, this legislation
simultaneously empowered Main Justice, which was Congress's partner in the endeavor to
achieve nationwide "compliance" with the Sentencing Guidelines. In its 2005 decision in United
States v. Booker, the Supreme Court undid the Feeney Amendment, introduced the opportunity
for judges openly to exercise judgment independent of the Guidelines, constrained the leverage
that inheres in prosecutors in a mandatory sentencing regime, and counteracted the centralizing
impulse of Main Justice. The Court's recent decisions elaborating Booker confirm that, once
again, sentencing is to a significant extent a "local" event. The Sentencing Commission and Main
Justice may still be calling signals but the decision makers on the playing field-judges and
prosecutors - need not follow them. The pendulum of sentencing practice may increasingly
swing back toward the exercise of informed discretion as newly appointed local decision makers
are able to see beyond the narrow and arbitrary "frame" of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
A U T H O R. Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The author appreciates the
research assistance of Logan Beirne, Claire McCusker, Anne O'Hagen, Richard Re, Katherine
Schettig, and Andrew Verstein; the questions posed by participants in the Seminar on Advanced
Criminal Law at Fordham Law School, and in the Honours Class on Sentencing, Faculty of Law
and Criminology, University of Leiden, Netherlands; and the powerful insights into sentencing
and criminal justice in the companion piece in this issue by Dan Richman. Working with editor
Madhu Chugh has been a special privilege.
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INTRODUCTION
In the federal criminal justice system, both prosecutors and judges have
historically exercised broad discretion -prosecutors in charging (or not
charging), and judges in sentencing. Both prosecutorial and judicial discretion
in the criminal process date back to the very beginnings of the Republic.' For
most of our history, the exercise of discretion has simply been taken for
granted by judges, by prosecutors, and most importantly, by Congress, which
has created a system of criminal laws that requires -and has always required -
the exercise of discretion. Unlike the civil system in continental Europe, the
common law has never featured or claimed to feature mandatory exercise of
prosecutorial power.
In the modern era, we have grown suspicious of discretion. To a formalist,
discretion seems the very antithesis of law. To a realist who views law as
simply power, discretion is, at best (in Judge Marvin Frankel's memorable
book title), "law without order."2 A central campaign of the modern age-
extending far beyond sentencing and the criminal justice system -has been to
reduce the discretion of government officials.'
I use the term "power" to refer to lawful authority to take action against an
individual. "Discretion," on the other hand, is the authority not to exercise
power. In the context of the criminal law, to exercise discretion means, most
simply, to decide not to investigate, prosecute, or punish to the full extent
available under law. Discretion in federal criminal law enforcement is so great
and so difficult to constrain because it is a necessary concomitant of the
substantive federal criminal law.4 That is, federal statutory criminal law has
1. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 225 n.7 (1993). Indeed, the first
federal criminal law used the word "discretion" in referring to the federal judge's sentencing
authority to pronounce any sentence below the statutory maximum. See KATE STITH &Jost
A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9 (1998)
(quoting the federal Bribery Law of 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 46-47 (1789)).
2. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
3. See Kate Stith-Cabranes, Fear of Discretion, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 209 (1998) (reviewing PHILIP K.
HOwARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAw IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994)).
4. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COM. L. 532,
533 (197o) (discussing the "overcriminalization" of laws the legislature does not wish to be
enforced); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 746 (1996) (arguing that legislatures, "by creating too many policy
choices, have effectively abdicated public policy-making to the prosecutor since it is the
prosecutor, and not the legislature, that has the final decision in determining which public
policy, if any, is breached by an individual's conduct"); Daniel C. Richman & William J.
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great breadth and has always included both lesser-included offenses and
overlapping offenses. Moreover, the federal criminal law has always been an
adjunct to state criminal law; most conduct that violates federal law also
violates state law. Thus, in many instances, federal prosecutors must decide
both whether to intervene in potential state prosecutions and, if they do choose
to intervene, which crimes to charge. Federal prosecutorial decision makers
(whoever they may be-line prosecutors, U.S. Attorneys, or officials and
bureaucrats in the Department of Justice) necessarily have broad charging
discretion. Concomitantly, sentencing authorities (whoever they may be-
judges, administrative agencies, or prosecutors) necessarily have broad
discretion over punishment. As Congress well understands when it enacts
federal criminal proscriptions, both prosecutorial and sentencing discretion are
inevitable because of the broad reach of these proscriptions and the severity of
authorized punishments.' Resource constraints as well as prudence dictate the
conclusion that the federal criminal law cannot be applied in its full rigor.6
Someone has to exercise authority to decide what to investigate, what to
prosecute, what to charge, and how great punishment will be.
The inevitable exercise of charging and sentencing discretion in the federal
criminal justice system has been a recurring theme in the saga of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, whose recent transformation by the Supreme Court
from a "mandatory" to an "advisory" regime7 I consider in this essay. I do not
Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 583, 584, 639 (2005) (arguing against an "overexpansion of the federal
criminal code," allowing prosecutors who suspect a person of one crime to "charge and
convict him of a different crime, unrelated to and less severe than the first"). Even with its
expansion over centuries, and especially in the past fifty years, federal criminal law does not
reach all conduct that is criminalized by states. See infra note 31.
5. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 789-81o (1999) (noting that Congress has more control
over federal prosecutors than scholars generally recognize, but that it is in Congress's
interest to allow for significant federal prosecutorial discretion and regional variation in
prosecutorial policies); Nicholas Parrillo, The Rise of Non-Profit Government in America:
An Overview and a Case Study 112-124 (Jan. 8, 20o8) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (demonstrating that Congress in 1896 changed the compensation of U.S. Attorneys
from fee per-case to annual salary in order to encourage the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion).
6. There is a good argument that federal law is properly broad and, if applied in full, severe.
See Gerard E. Lynch, OurAdministrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117,
2137-38 (1998); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HI-Rv. L. REy. (forthcoming June
2008).
7. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586
(2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007); Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct.
2456 (2007).
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view the Court's recent Guidelines decisions only from an internal
perspective -that is, in terms of the competing constitutional doctrines
expounded in these cases. Rather, I consider the recent decisions against the
backdrop of inevitable, ongoing institutional rivalries. The institutions in play
include not only the inferior federal courts (both trial and appellate), Congress,
and the U.S. Sentencing Commission, but also the Supreme Court, federal
prosecutors in the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys' offices, and, importantly, the
U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. ("Main Justice"). Early
scholarship on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines focused on the transfer of
sentencing authority from judges to the Sentencing Commission; later studies
have examined the transfer of discretion from judges to prosecutors. Of equal
significance are two other ongoing competitions for power: one between local
federal prosecutors and officials in Main Justice, the other between Congress
and the Supreme Court. In its 20o5 decision in United States v. Booker and its
recent decisions elaborating the new sentencing regime constructed in Booker,
the Supreme Court asserted the significant responsibility and authority of
sentencing judges, local prosecutors, and the Supreme Court itself.
In Part I, I seek to identify the critical decisions made in constructing and
implementing the Guidelines, decisions that ultimately resulted in increased
prosecutorial power and discretion. This discretion could, and would, be used
to influence defendants to plead guilty or face remarkably severe Guidelines
sentences. Although it was not the goal either of sentencing reformers or of
Congress, the actual result of the Guidelines regime that took effect in late 1987
was to transfer sentencing authority not to the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
but to federal prosecutors in general and - particularly in recent years - to Main
Justice.
Because I have elsewhere expressed skepticism about the project of uniform
application of sentencing rules, 9 I do not dwell here on the issue that motivated
the Sentencing Reform Act' ° - the existence of "disparity" among judges in
sentencing. Disparity unquestionably exists. But requiring judges to apply
national sentencing rules risks masking both the continued significance of the
individual judge in sentencing and the increased leverage over defendants
afforded to prosecutors in plea bargaining. The federal effort to stamp out
8. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
9. Sec STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 78-177.
io. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §5 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1988)).
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judicial disparity through the Guidelines was probably not successful."1 In any
event, the decades-long enterprise provided prosecutors with indecent power
relative to both defendants and judges, in large part because of prosecutors'
ability to threaten full application of the severe Sentencing Guidelines.
Part II explains why neither appellate decisions nor raw sentencing data are
an accurate tool to measure the Guidelines' success in achieving greater
national uniformity in sentencing -nor even for measuring the extent to which
the Guidelines are actually implemented. Each criminal sentencing is
ultimately highly "local," a result of the strategic decisions of the prosecutor,
the defense attorney, and the judge -all acting within the factual confines of
the case at hand as well as the larger norms and practices of the judge's
courtroom, of the federal district, and of the relevant circuit. Further, the
sentencing decisions of the courts of appeals -including the "win/loss" ratio
for defendants and the government-tell us very little about law on the
ground. Few sentencing decisions are appealed by defendants, and even fewer
are appealed by the government. 2 While courts of appeals may use these cases
to signal to district courts how rigorously they should apply the Guidelines,
this signal is imperfect at best and may be ignored altogether in cases that are
not likely to be appealed. Indeed, even ground-level sentencing data -the sort
of data assiduously compiled by the Sentencing Commission for every sentence
in the federal courts - is a poor measure of the extent of Guidelines
implementation and compliance. Although we can count the case reports
submitted by judges, and thereby determine the ratio of reported Guidelines
sentences to reported non-Guidelines sentences, there is no way to judge how
accurate these reports are-or even what "complying" with the Guidelines
would mean.
The unreliability of appellate decisions and raw sentencing data as
portrayals of actual practice has not always been appreciated. Interested
political observers, in particular, have looked to appellate case law and to the
frequency of reported non-Guidelines sentences as a measure of the extent to
which judges have "complied" with the Guidelines and thus implemented
Congress's design to reduce sentencing disparity. Part III recounts Congress's
2003 decision-in reaction to sentencing decisions in particular white-collar
cases and to nationwide data that appeared to reveal that sentencing judges
were willfully ignoring the Guidelines in a growing proportion of cases-to
enact legislation that represented a direct challenge to every level of the federal
judiciary, the Sentencing Commission, and local prosecutors. By design, this
ii. See infra Section ll.B.
12. See infra Section II.A.
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legislation, known as the Feeney Amendment ("Feeney"), 3 simultaneously
empowered Main Justice, which was Congress's partner in the endeavor to
limit if not eliminate the exercise of discretion by decision makers in the field.
Feeney added language to the Sentencing Reform Act to overturn a unanimous
Supreme Court case, Koon v. United States,'4 that appeared to encourage judicial
disregard of the Guidelines. Feeney also directed the Sentencing Commission
to amend the Guidelines to reduce judicial discretion to impose below-
Guidelines sentences, and directed the Department of Justice to monitor the
sentencing advocacy of prosecutors and the sentencing decisions of judges - all
in aid of reducing the opportunities for individual judges and prosecutors to
exercise discretion outside the confines of the Guidelines.
I explain in Part IV why Booker (as well as Booker's immediate predecessor,
Blakely v. Washington,'" and Booker's progeny of 200716) can be understood as
an institutional response by the Supreme Court-which for more than a decade
had been loath to intervene or even seriously analyze constitutional and other
issues raised by the Guidelines -to several developments that threatened the
integrity of federal criminal sentencing and, indeed, of the whole federal
criminal justice system. In a dramatic exercise of judicial power, Booker undid
the Feeney Amendment, limited the power that inheres in prosecutors in a
regime of mandatory sentencing rules, and counteracted the centralizing
impulse of Main Justice. The doctrinal basis of Booker's holding that
mandatory Guidelines are unconstitutional, sounding primarily in the jury-
trial right of the Sixth Amendment, had been elaborated over the course of
several years- beginning in the late 199os, continuing with Apprendi in 2000,17
and most importantly with Blakely in 2004. But it is not a mere coincidence, in
my view, that both Blakely and Booker- including the latter's unexpected
remedy that left the Guidelines in place but assertedly made them "advisory" -
occurred in the wake of Congress's own extraordinary intervention in 2003 and
Main Justice's subsequent restrictions (required by Feeney) on local
prosecutorial autonomy.
The Supreme Court's three federal sentencing decisions of 2007 reaffirm
that Booker restored significant judicial power, and thus permits the exercise of
13. The Feeney Amendment, introduced by Representative Tom Feeney of Florida, was enacted
as Title IV of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of
Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2oo3, Pub. L. No. 1O8-21,117 Stat. 650, 667.
14. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
15. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
16. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558
(2007); Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
17. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2ooo).
1426
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judicial discretion, over sentencing; post-Booker discretion is greater even than
that which existed under the pre-Feeney Guidelines, though not nearly as great
as that which existed in the pre-Guidelines era. By introducing the opportunity
for federal trial judges openly to exercise judgment independent of the
Guidelines, Booker and its progeny not only allow judges to provide a
counterweight to prosecutorial leverage over defendants, but also counteract
the constraints that Main Justice imposed on line prosecutors in the wake of
the Feeney Amendment."8 Once again, sentencing is to a significant extent a
"local" event. After Booker, the Sentencing Commission and Main Justice may
still be calling signals but the decision makers on the playing field -judges and
prosecutors - need not follow them.
I. TRY AND CATCH THE WIND: EFFORTS TO LIMIT DISCRETION IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Neither sentencing reformers nor their supporters in Congress set out to
transfer sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors. The idea of Marvin
Frankel, then a judge in the Southern District of New York and later exalted as
the "father of sentencing reform" by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, 9 was
simply to make criminal sentencing subject to "law." Judge Frankel did not
foresee (or at least did not discuss) the possibility that written sentencing rules
could have the effect of transferring sentencing discretion to prosecutors. But
the drafters of the Sentencing Reform Act (including then-Professor Stephen
Breyer, on leave from Harvard Law School and serving on Kennedy's staff
when the Senator introduced sentencing reform legislation in the late 197os)
were aware of this possibility. They sought to give the new administrative
agency charged with writing sentencing rules, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, authority to ensure that these rules, and not the charging
decisions of prosecutors, would determine federal sentences. Likewise, the
original members of that Commission (who included then-Judge Stephen
Breyer of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit) made earnest efforts on
several fronts to cabin not only the discretion of judges but also, to a lesser
extent, the discretion of prosecutors. The Commission was assisted in this
effort by Main Justice, which directed U.S. Attorneys and front-line
prosecutors to limit their exercise of discretion, and thereby achieved a measure
of centralized control over federal prosecutorial charging and sentencing
decisions.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 193-201.
19. 128 CONG. REC. 26,503 (1982).
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A. The Sentencing Reform Act of1984: Sentencing Rules To Control Judges
The most direct method of limiting discretion is to spell out in detail the
rules that decision makers must apply, so as to reduce the need or opportunity
for the exercise of judgment. A paradigmatic example is the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines,2 ° whose overriding purpose was to reduce inter-judge sentencing
disparity by reducing judicial discretion.' The Guidelines are an
extraordinarily complex set of sentencing factors, with weights attached to each
factor that judges were instructed to apply to calculate each offender's
"applicable [G]uideline[s] range."2" The Sentencing Reform Act required that
judges sentence within this range unless there was a lawful ground for
"departure," either specified by the Sentencing Commission in the Guidelines
themselves or, residually, if the case involved highly atypical and extraordinary
factors not taken into account by the Commission in its Guidelines.23 In order
to ensure that sentencing judges faithfully and fully applied the Guidelines,
including their requirement of "real offense" sentencing and their limitations
2o. In each year since 1987, the U.S. Sentencing Commission has published the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Manual. See, e.g., U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (2007).
Inasmuch as the Commission often amends the Guidelines, Guidelines law changes from
year to year. As a general matter, defendants are sentenced on the basis of the Guidelines in
force at the time of the crime of conviction.
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 9 9 4(f) (2000) ("The Commission, in promulgating guidelines pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), shall promote the purposes set forth in section 9 9 1(b)(1), with particular
attention to the requirements of subsection 991(b)(1)(B) for providing certainty and
fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities."); S. REP. No. 98-225,
at 38 (1983) (noting that legislation provides for "detailed guidelines for sentencing similarly
situated offenders in order to provide for a greater certainty and uniformity in sentencing"
(quoting testimony ofAtt'y Gen. William French Smith)).
22. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § iB1.2(b).
23. The Guidelines list more than ten factors warranting upward departure and generally
discourage all downward departures save those explicitly provided for in the Guidelines,
which include "Substantial Assistance to Authorities," U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 20, § 5Ki.1, and partial justification or excuse, see id. § 5K2. Residual
departure authority was limited by the Sentencing Reform Act to "aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000). This
provision was "severed and excised" by the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 245 (2005). In addition, until the Feeney Amendment, the courts tended to treat as
residual departure authority the finding of "aberrant" behavior (which the Guidelines
Manual never listed as a basis for departure, but which was mentioned in the introductory
chapter of the original Manual and was subsequently transferred to an Application Note in
the chapter on departures); the Feeney Amendment directly amended the Guidelines to
narrow the basis of the "aberrant" behavior departure. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N,
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § 5K2.20.
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on departures from the calculated Guidelines range, the Sentencing Reform
Act provided, for the first time, that both the defendant and the government
would have the right to appeal. Appeals could be based either on the ground
that the sentencing judge had misapplied the Guidelines in calculating the
range or on the ground that the judge had departed from this range for a
reason not expressly sanctioned by the Guidelines or the Sentencing Reform
Act.' In other words, district judges had an obligation to implement the
Guidelines, and the courts of appeals would be available in every case to
"police" the sentencing judges.2"
Accordingly, from their inception, the Sentencing Commission's
proclamations were not merely "guidelines" or recommendations, but
enforceable rules that sentencing judges were legally obliged to follow. Even
the sentencing judge's authority to impose a sentence outside the calculated
Guidelines range (to "depart") was itself the subject of Guidelines, technically
called "Policy Statements, "26 issued by the Commission. Opportunities for
departure did exist. In the most important of these, the judge was released of
all obligation to give a sentence in the Guidelines range when the government
made a motion (the "5K1 motion," as it became known, after the section of the
Guidelines authorizing such motions)27 for a downward departure on the
ground that the defendant had substantially assisted in the prosecution of
others. Beyond such government-sponsored departures for cooperators,
however, the original Guidelines limited interstitial opportunities to depart for
reasons not expressly permitted by the Guidelines themselves. Indeed,
inasmuch as departures not expressly permitted by the Guidelines were
available only in cases exhibiting extraordinary circumstances or aberrant
behavior,s the Guidelines were for all intents and purposes "mandatory" for
most defendants other than cooperators. As Justice Antonin Scalia recognized
in his 1989 dissent in Mistretta (involving a challenge to the constitutionality of
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). This provision was "severed and excised" by the Supreme Court in
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
25. See Kate Stith, The Hegemony of the Sentencing Commission, 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 14, 16 (1996)
(noting the responsibility of courts of appeals to "police" departures).
26. The Sentencing Commission has authority to issue "Guidelines" and "Policy Statements,"
and it also issues "Commentary"; in virtually all legal respects the three types of rules are
equivalent, and were equally binding on judges prior to the decision in United States v.
Booker. See Stinson v. United States, 5o8 U.S. 36, 41-47 (1993); Williams v. United States,
503 U.S. 191, 210 (1992); U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, 5 iB.7.
Hence this essay follows convention in referring to all three types of Commission-issued
rules as "Guidelines."
27. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § 5K1.1.
28. See supra note 23.
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the Guidelines regime on separation-of-powers grounds),29 and as Justice
Harry Blackmun's majority opinion refused to acknowledge, the Guidelines
were law.3"
The intentions of the Sentencing Commission notwithstanding, reducing
judicial discretion through sentencing rules-whether promulgated by a
legislature or by an administrative agency such as the Commission -threatens
to enhance prosecutorial authority over sentencing: once the rules are
published, the prosecutor, through her discretionary charging authority,
effectively determines what the defendant's Guidelines sentencing range will
be. To be sure, prosecutorial charging practices have always affected the
sentence, but when judges had discretion to impose any sentence up to the
statutory maximum or down to the statutory minimum, prosecutorial power
was potentially limited or counterbalanced by the possibility of judicial
discretion. Moreover, it is an overstatement to suggest that a federal prosecutor
ever has unlimited discretion in selecting charges or determining the sentence.
Though certainly broad-ranging, even the federal criminal law is limited in its
scope and often detailed in its specification of elements of an offense; as a
result, evidentiary and resource constraints necessarily limit the charges that a
prosecutor can bring in any given case.3
Yet there is no doubt that because they set forth the consequences of each
statutory charge and each specified sentencing factor, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines had the potential to effect a transfer of discretion over the severity
of punishment from the judge to the prosecutor. Indeed, even as Congress set
about in the late 1970s and early 198os to construct a system in which judicial
discretion would be severely limited, the architects of that system realized the
possibility that the effect of their reform efforts could be to transfer decision-
making power not to the bureaucratic institution they were creating to write
z9. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413-17 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3o. See generally Kate Stith, United States v. Mistretta: The Constitution and the Sentencing
Guidelines, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 455, 475-80 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
31. See, e.g., United States v. D'Angelo, No. o2Cr399, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2239, at *2-3
(E.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 2004) (Gleeson, J.) (granting judgment of acquittal in a RICO
prosecution because the government failed to prove that the defendant committed the
murder in connection with a "racketeering enterprise"). On the other hand, within the scope
of federal criminal law, federal prosecutorial authority is nearly plenary. See Bruce A. Green,
"Hare and Hounds": The Fugitive Defendant's Constitutional Right To Be Pursued, 56 BROOK. L.
REV. 439, 505 (1990) ("The prosecution enjoys virtually unfettered discretion in deciding
how to allocate investigative and prosecutorial resources.").
1430
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sentencing rules (namely, the U.S. Sentencing Commission), but to federal
prosecutors .32
In the early years during which Congress debated Senator Kennedy's
sentencing reform bill, the Justice Department may not have fully realized the
potential of sentencing rules to enhance prosecutorial power. The Department
did not oppose efforts to reform sentencing, but a review of the legislative
materials indicates that, at best, sentencing reform was not high on the
legislative agenda of the Carter Administration. 33 The Department's Criminal
Division was in any event preoccupied with other concerns, which ultimately
did lead to incremental first steps in the centralization of prosecutorial
discretion in Main Justice. In the wake of the ABSCAM investigation, which
ensnared and convicted several members of Congress and led to oversight
hearings highly critical of the underlying investigation,' the Criminal Division
in 1979 promulgated nationwide regulations on the use of informants and
32. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 63 (1983) (noting that "[s]ome critics expressed the concern that a
sentencing guidelines system will simply shift discretion from sentencing judges to
prosecutors.... The Bill contains a provision designed to avoid this possibility.... [T]he
Sentencing Commission is directed to issue policy statements for consideration by Federal
judges in deciding whether to accept a plea agreement."); id. at 167 (similar). One of the
earliest warnings that sentencing rules would transfer discretion to prosecutors came from
Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals
for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978).
33. Throughout the Carter Administration, the Department strongly supported the nearly
decade-long effort to reform federal criminal law through the ambitious route of recodifying
all of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. See Legislation To Revise and Recodify Federal Criminal Laws:
Hearing on H.R. 6869 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong. 37 (1978) (Department of Justice Memorandum on the Provisions of
Chapters 1 Through 18 of the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1978) ("As the Department of
Justice previously has made clear, we attach tremendous importance to this legislation. The
federal criminal justice system can operate only as fairly and effectively as is permitted by the
statutory law itself. There is no doubt that the existing laws are greatly in need of
substantive revision. With the continued, concentrated work of this Subcommittee, the
creation of a modern Federal Criminal Code can be achieved before the end of this
Congress. The task, as noted by Chairman [Peter W.] Rodino, is 'monumental'; the result,
as noted by Attorney General [Griffin] Bell, will be 'one of the greatest legislative feats of
modern times."').
34. See FBI Undercover Guidelines: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 7th Cong. (1981). As to ABSCAM
generally, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, ABSCAM, http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/
abscam.htm (last visited April 3, 2008) ("During the 1970's, the FBI conducted a high-level
investigation of public corruption and organized crime, code-named ABSCAM. This
investigation resulted in the arrest and conviction of a senator, six congressmen, and
additional public officials. ABSCAM generated considerable controversy relating to the
government's undercover operations and entrapment issues.").
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undercover agents by the FBI.3" Of even greater potential significance, the
Criminal Division prepared and published in 1980, under the signature of
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, the first general policy statement to guide
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion within each of the ninety-four districts.
The 198o Principles of Federal Prosecution provided somewhat abstract guidance
relevant to all types of federal prosecutions, while conceding the importance of
local control over prosecutorial priorities and saying very little about
sentencing. 6
In these years, the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys exercised significant local
autonomy both in charging and in setting prosecutorial priorities. While
approval from Main Justice was required by statute in some circumstances (for
instance, prior to seeking a court-authorized wiretap) ,7 and by internal
regulation for prosecution of certain offenses (for instance, where the conduct
has already been prosecuted in state court)," for the most part there was little
centralized control of line prosecutors -Assistant U.S. Attorneys -beyond that
which a U.S. Attorney might choose to exercise within his own district.3 9 The
Justice Department itself had no policies related to criminal sentencing. Indeed,
the 1980 version of Principles of Federal Prosecution cautioned prosecutors not to
make "sentencing recommendations" unless required to do so by a plea
agreement or where warranted by "the public interest.
40
Under the Reagan Administration, however, the Department included the
Sentencing Reform Act in its pending crime control proposals. 4' The
Department strongly supported sentencing guidelines as a means of achieving
nationwide sentencing uniformity and ensuring more severe punishment of
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/
fbiundercover.pdf.
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION (1980). The current much-
revised and expanded version is found in §§ 9-27.O01-.76o of the U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
U.S. ATFORtNEYS' MANUAL (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foiareading-room/usarnVtile9/27mcrm.htm.
37. See Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral
Communications, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2516 (2000).
38. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 36, § 9-2.031
(discussing the "Petite Policy" on dual federal and state prosecutions).
39. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1543-44,
1562-63 & n.136 (1981).
40. See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 36, at 5o.
41. See S. 1762, 98th Cong. tit. 2 (1983). Other tides of the 1984 legislation included bail reform
providing for preventive detention, criminal forfeiture, and limitations on the federal
insanity defense. See S. 1762, 98th Cong., tits. 1, 3, 4 (1983).
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violent and white-collar crime; departmental spokesmen expressly noted and
approved the prospect of guidelines that would be based not just on the offense
of conviction, but also on the offender's criminal history and the particular
facts of his criminal conduct.42 As enacted, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
provided that a representative of the Department of Justice would sit ex officio
on the Commission.43
The 1984 legislation included provisions that sought to ensure that the
advent of sentencing guidelines would not simply transfer sentencing authority
to line prosecutors in their plea bargaining with defendants. The Sentencing
Reform Act specifically authorized the Commission to issue policy statements
governing judicial review of plea agreements under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.' The accompanying Senate Report explained, "This
guidance will assure that judges can examine plea agreements to make certain
that prosecutors have not used plea bargaining to undermine the sentencing
guidelines." 4s Of equal significance, the statute contained several admonitions
that in effect urged the Sentencing Commission to adopt sentencing rules that
were based not only on the offense of conviction (which would give individual
prosecutors significant control over the sentence by exercising their charging
4z. See Federal Sentencing Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2013, H.R. 3128, H.R. 4554, and H.R. 4827
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 9 8th Cong. 802, 804
(1984) (testimony of Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division) (testifying
that under proposed legislation "sentences would be imposed by judges pursuant to a
sophisticated guideline system" and the guidelines would take into account "the particular
history and characteristics of the defendant and the particular circumstances of the
offense"); Hearings on S. 829 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 9 8th Cong. 7 (1983) (statement of William French Smith, Att'y Gen. of the United
States) (proposing "sentencing reform in order to reduce the considerable disparity in the
sentencing process and also to restore truth in sentencing," and noting that the bill would
abolish parole, establish uniform and determinate sentencing, authorize government
sentencing appeals, provide mandatory sentencing for violent crime, and "enhance the
deterrent effect of imprisonment ... in the area of 'white collar' crime").
43. 28 U.S.C. S 991(a) (2000). This provision also provided that at least three of the seven
commissioners would be federal judges. It was amended by the Feeney Amendment, in
2003, to provide that "no more than" three federal judges could be commissioners. See infra
note 188 and accompanying text.
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (a)(2)(E) (1988). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 governs the
guilty-plea hearing and the acceptance of guilty pleas; it requires, inter alia, that all plea
agreements be placed on the record and that the court ascertain the "factual basis" for the
plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. ii.
45. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 63 (1983).
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discretion), but also on additional aspects of the offender's "real offense," 46 in
order to avoid undue control of sentences by prosecutors.
B. The Sentencing Commission: "Real Offense" Sentencing To Control
Prosecutorial Undermining of Sentencing Rules
The Sentencing Commission, too, well understood from the beginning that
sentencing rules could simply transfer discretion to prosecutors.47 Yet many
thoughtful reformers4 - apparently including Judge Breyer, one of the original
members of the Commission- doubted the feasibility of regulating
prosecutorial charging authority through the simple mechanism of ex ante
rules. In the introductory chapter of the Guidelines, widely understood to have
been written by Judge Breyer, the Commission asserted that it had "decided
that these initial guidelines will not, in general, make significant changes in
current plea agreement practices. '49 While a strong proponent of the
Guidelines "real offense" approach, s" Breyer was apparently of the
"incrementalist"' view that both judicial and prosecutorial discretion could not
simultaneously be limited. In any event, the Commission was busy enough just
trying to write from scratch sentencing rules for judges, and it is highly
46. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1)(B), 994(c) (2000); see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1,.
8-12 (1988); William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REv. 495, 501 (1990).
47. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 238 (1989) ("Virtually no one
denied the existence of the problem.").
48. See, e.g., THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 24-27 (1976) (proposing that legislators should require prosecutors
to issue internal guidelines on charging policies); James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion
of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651, 678-83 (providing a similar account); see also
Franklin E. Zimring, Principles of Criminal Sentencing, Plain and Fancy, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 73
(1987) (expressing skepticism about sentencing guidelines).
49. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § I.Ai.i (Commentary,
Application Note § 4(c)). The original Introduction to the Guidelines Manual was moved to
an application note in 2000.
so. See Breyer, supra note 46, at 8-14, 18-20, 28-31. Breyer referred to the Guidelines approach as
"modified real-offense" sentencing, apparently because one Commissioner had proposed
that sentences be based entirely on "real offense" harms, with no consideration of other
factors. See id. at 10-12.
s. See Ilene H. Nagel, Foreward, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 8o J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 913-39 (1990) (discussing "incrementalist"
reformers).
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unlikely that the Department of Justice would have continued to support the
enterprise if the Commission had sought to constrain directly the discretion of
prosecutors as well as judges.
The Commission did, however, make a powerful attempt to restrain
prosecutorial discretion indirectly, by accepting Congress's invitation to use the
offense of conviction only as the starting point for the calculation of an
offender's Guidelines sentence. The final Guidelines, promulgated in mid-1987
to take effect on November 1, 1987, provided that the ultimate sentence would
be calculated on the additional basis of a host of supplementary aggravating
factors (and a few mitigating factors), including consideration of the offender's
criminal behavior related to the crime of conviction (even if not charged or
convicted) and his prior criminal convictions. s2 Paradoxically, the Commission
sought to limit prosecutorial control of sentencing by imposing additional
controls on thejudge- specifically, requiring her to sentence not on the basis of
the offense of conviction alone, but also on the basis of "real offense" factors
beyond the offense of conviction. The idea was that these "real offense" factors
either existed or did not exist in any given case; it did not matter whether the
prosecutor charged them or not. In this way, a sentence would be based on the
rules set forth by the Commission, not on the exercise of discretion by either
the judge or the prosecutor.
Stephen Breyer has been perhaps the most influential supporter of some
sort of Guidelines regime. He has many times explained-first as a judge and
Commissioner," and most recently as a justice in his Apprendi and Blakely
dissents 4 and his Booker remedy opinion"s - that the reason that the Guidelines
require "real offense" instead of "charged offense" sentencing is to ensure that
punishment is not based on the arbitrary value judgments of the judge or the
prosecutor. Rather, sentencing is to be based on the value judgments of the
expert agency whose rules are written in advance without any particular
defendant in mind. To ensure that judges sentence on the basis of "actual"
offense conduct, rather than what the prosecutor charges, the particular
sentencing rules created by the Commission were based on easily ascertainable
factors such as prior convictions, and on quantifiable criteria such as amount of
drugs or amount of monetary loss. The Guidelines largely ignore-indeed,
52. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § 1BI.3 (setting forth factors
relevant to "determin[ing] the Guidelines Range").
53. See Id. § 1.1-1.9; Breyer, supra note 46, at 8-12.
54. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 330-31 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555-56 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5s. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 254-57 (2005) (Breyer, J.).
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generally prohibit consideration of-less objective criteria such as those
relating to the character or personal history of the offender. 6
Moreover, chapter six of the Guidelines included several admonitions to
judges designed to avoid prosecutorial undermining of the enterprise of "real
offense" sentencing. While these instructions were clearly in tension with the
assertion in the introduction of the Guidelines that the Commission did not
intend to interfere with plea bargaining, the chapter six policies addressing
these bargains were directed to the judge rather than to the prosecutor. s7 A
judge could accept a plea agreement to drop or withhold some charges only if
"the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense
behavior.", 8 Similarly, the judge could accept an agreement providing for
departure from the Guidelines range only if there was a "justifiable" reason 9
for the departure, as provided in the Sentencing Reform Act or the Guidelines
themselves. A third rule required that all plea agreements accepted by a judge
must "set forth the relevant facts and circumstances of the actual offense
conduct" and "not contain misleading facts.,,60 Finally, the Commission
asserted that the sentencing judge is not bound by factual stipulations of the
parties, but instead is to determine "the facts."'"
C. The Inquisitorial Implications of "Real Offense" Sentencing
It is one thing to tell the judge that she must sentence on the basis of "the
facts." It is something else altogether to ensure that she knows what "the facts"
are. The prosecutor and defense attorney in a common law, adversarial system
of justice do not, separately or in tandem, perform the function assigned to an
investigating magistrate in an inquisitorial system. In particular, as long as
defendants are allowed to plead guilty and as long as prosecutors do not
operate under a requirement of "mandatory" prosecution, it will be in the
interest of both parties in many cases to arrive at a settlement that involves less
than full application of the law. Where a negotiated settlement has been
56. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § 1B1.3 (specifying which
factors are relevant to "determin[ing] the Guidelines Range"). See generally STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 1, at 66-77; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing
Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CaiM. L. REv. 833 (1992).
57. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § 6B ("Plea Agreements").
58. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § 6Bl.2(a) (emphasis added).
59. Id. § 6Bl.2(b)(2), (c)(2).
6o. Id. § 6B1.4(a) (emphasis added).
61. Id. § 6B1. 4 (d).
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reached, neither the defense attorney nor the prosecutor has any incentive to
inform the sentencing judge of facts beyond those corresponding to the
elements of the offense to which the defendant has pled guilty and the
Guidelines factors that the parties have agreed are relevant. The judge in the
common law tradition is not an independent investigator, but rather, a neutral
factfinder on the basis of the evidence brought to her attention by the parties in
the case.
The Sentencing Commission was aware of this problem. To overcome it,
the Commission adopted a further inquisitorial procedural innovation by
enlisting a third party-beholden neither to the prosecutor nor to the
defendant -to assist the judge in ferreting out "the facts" of the case. This third
party was the probation officer, an employee of the judicial branch whose task
during the era of discretionary sentencing was to provide the judge with a pre-
sentence report containing, in addition to a social history of the defendant, an
outline of the two "versions" of the facts -those pressed by the prosecutor and
those pressed by the defendant. The Sentencing Commission boldly sought to
transform both the role of the probation officer and the content of the pre-
sentence report. Henceforth it would contain only one version, presumably
that of the probation officer himself, noting facts in dispute. Moreover, the
probation officer was assigned the task of determining the "actual" facts of the
case, independent of the parties. Finally, the Commission took great pains to
teach probation officers around the country the content and application of the
hundreds of pages of Guidelines rules, so that each one could perform for the
judge an initial calculation of the defendant's Guidelines range and any lawful
bases for departure up or down from this range.62
A final inquisitorial innovation was to require -rather than merely allow -
judges to base the sentence on the "actual" facts (the "real offense"). 6 3
Accordingly, the judge as factfinder was explicitly empowered to range beyond
the factual assertions of the parties, and even beyond whatever additional facts
the probation officer might have brought to her attention, through sua sponte
inquiries into the existence of aggravating or mitigating Guidelines factors that
no one else had raised.
In the early years of the Guidelines, complaints from defense counsel
suggested that this system was working as envisioned by the architects of the
Guidelines. There were suggestions that the probation officer was a "third
62. The transformed role of the probation officer is discussed in STITH & CABRANEs, supra note
i, at 85-91, 133; and Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933 (1995).
63. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIoELlNES MANUAL, supra note 20, 1BI.1 ("Application
Instructions").
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adversary in the courtroom,"6 4 advising the judge of facts that neither the
defense attorney nor the prosecutor sought to bring to the judge's attention.
And there was concern in many quarters that the Guidelines' list of sentence
enhancements -ranging from the amount of monetary loss in a fraud case to
the defendant's "role in the offense "6, or "obstructive" 66 conduct in the whole
gamut of federal criminal cases -essentially created new "Guidelines crimes."67
The defendant would, in effect, be held "accountable, 68 and punished for these
crimes -yet without any formal charge by prosecutorial authorities, much less
the opportunity to demand a trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The sentencing hearing in the Blakely case, under Washington State's
statutory regime of mandatory guidelines (which closely resembled the federal
system in structure), provides an example of the inquisitorial approach in
practice. There, the defendant pleaded guilty to kidnapping, and neither the
prosecutor nor the probation officer chose to allege at the sentencing stage that
the kidnapping was "aggravated," a finding that would have supported a
sentencing enhancement. But the judge knew enough about the case, which
had been widely publicized,6 9 to raise the issue on his own, and he ordered the
prosecutor to present evidence of aggravation, resulting in a three-day hearing
at the end of which the judge applied the sentencing enhancement.70 The
sentencing in Blakely proceeded as it would in an inquisitorial system, in which
64. Jerry Denzlinger & David Miller, The Federal Probation Officer: Life Before and After Guideline
Sentencing, 55 FED. PROBATION 49 (1991).
65. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § 3B.
66. See id. 5 3C.
67. This is the term used in STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 3 and thereafter, to describe the
Guidelines' specification and provision of punishment for antisocial or other aggravating
behavior. Justice Scalia's dissent in Mistretta did not use the term but certainly captured the
idea. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. This is a new criminal law term invented by the Sentencing Commission, roughly
equivalent to the term "liable" or "guilty." See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 20, S 1B1.3 cmt. n.i ("The principles and limits of sentencing accountability under
this [Relevant Conduct] guideline are not always the same as the principles and limits of
criminal liability.").
69. Armed Man Sought; Wife Reported Abducted, SEATTLE TiMES, Oct. 27, 1998, at B2; Kidnapped
Woman Is Freed; Estranged Husband Arrested, SEArLE TIMvES, Oct. 28, 1998, at B5; Rancher Is
Accused of Kidnapping Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1998, at A31.
70. See Kate Stith, Crime and Punishment Under the Constitution, 2004 Sup. CT. REv. 221, 268
(2005) ("Consider the peculiarity of that three-day sentencing hearing in Blakely, where the
prosecutor had to call witnesses to prove an accusation, spelled out in the criminal code, that
he had never charged.").
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the judge is charged not merely with fact-finding, but with finding out the
facts. 71
From a comparative law perspective, it is not surprising that mandatory
real offense sentencing was adopted in large part to limit the discretion of
prosecutors. Hallmarks of inquisitorial systems, in theory if not practice,7"
include the ideals of "mandatory" prosecution and of the dossier compiled by
an independent, investigatory factfinder.73
The U.S. Constitution, however, was not written to delineate the powers of
government and the rights of the accused in an inquisitorial system of justice.
Under the accusatorial approach embedded in our eighteenth century
Constitution, an individual cannot be formally punished for crimes with which
she was not duly charged and convicted. As discussed in Part IV, in its belated
constitutional awakening to the realities of regimes featuring determinate
sentencing enhancements, the Supreme Court held in Apprendi, Blakely, and
Booker that punishment for conduct for which the defendant has not been
charged and convicted-that is, for conduct that a judge decides, on a lesser
standard of proof, a defendant "really" did-is incompatible with the
adversarial procedures guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. In
retrospect, it is astounding that for a decade this basic constitutional defect of
the Guidelines system escaped the notice of every member of the Supreme
Court but one.74
pi. See Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process About Truth?: A German Perspective, 26 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 157, 161-62 (2003). But see also infra note 73.
72. See, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three
"Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 24o (1977); Abraham S.
Goldstein, Tribute, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal
Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1OO9 (1974).
73. See John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and
Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978); John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in
Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (1974). Ironically, in continental systems, the "inquisitorial"
approach is apparently limited to the investigatory and adjudicatory stages, while sentencing
authorities have broad discretion to sentence up to the lawful maximum. See, e.g., Thomas
Weigand, Sentencing and Punishment in Germany, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN
WESTERN COUNTRIES 188, 203-206 (Michael Tonry & Richard Frase eds., 2001); see also
Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 523, 536 (2007).
74. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 159 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 407 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In two other cases that, at least in hindsight, raised issues similar to Apprendi, Blakely,
and Booker, the Court was unanimous. See Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998);
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.
79, 95 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding constitutional infirmity in a state sentencing
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D. Main Justice: Constraints on Prosecutors and the Pursuit of Centralized
Control
As noted, the Guidelines' requirement of "real offense" sentencing and
nonadversarial judicial fact-finding directly constrained only judges. There
were no comparable directions to prosecutors. Yet the new regime could
succeed only if prosecutors refrained from encouraging pleas of guilty by
agreeing not to bring to the judge's (or the probation officer's) attention one or
more available "Guidelines crimes"7 - aggravating Guidelines factors that
required additional punishment. Whatever the desires of Congress and the
Sentencing Commission, prosecutors have a strong incentive to settle cases, if
only to be able to investigate and prosecute the next case in the long line of
matters awaiting their attention. Moreover, plea bargaining norms and
practices, and the relationships among probation officers and prosecutors,
varied greatly among the ninety-four federal districts in the country and among
judges and prosecutors within particular districts. 76 If the Sentencing
Guidelines were to achieve the goal of reducing inter-judge disparity
throughout the federal system, it would be necessary to attend more directly to
wide variances in prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining.
Main Justice swiftly came to the rescue. 77 Although it had never before
sought to direct or monitor routine charging and plea decisions across the land,
the Department of Justice in 1989 issued a new directive that sought to hold all
federal prosecutors to the Guidelines' regime of "real offense" sentencing, and
in particular sought to prohibit "fact bargaining" over sentencing
enhancements. 7' To be sure, the "Thornburgh Memorandum," as it came to be
enhancement statute); id. at 93 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting) (similar). These cases are also discussed infra text accompanying notes 219-223.
75. See supra note 67.
76. See Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of
Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IowA L. REV. 1043, 1135 (2001) ("[I]n place of a single
,uniform national sentencing system, the Guidelines have created a network of separate local
and regional systems."); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 793 (2003).
77. In fact, Main Justice issued a hundred-page "Prosecutor's Handbook on Sentencing
Guidelines" on the very day that the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect, November i,
1987. Two days later, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division,
Stephen Trott, issued a parallel policy statement. The 1989 Thornburgh Memorandum,
discussed and quoted in text, largely repeated the admonitions of the two earlier
memoranda, but was issued under the signature of Attorney General Richard Thornburgh.
78. Tony Garoppolo, Fact Bargaining: What the Sentencing Commission Hath Wrought, 1O BNA
CRIMINAL PRACTIcE MANUAL 405 (1996); see also id. at 406 ("If Mother Teresa became an
1440
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known after the Attorney General who issued it, was not the first step toward
centralization of policies on prosecutorial charging discretion. As previously
noted, in the final days of the Carter Administration, the Department had
issued general "principles" to guide federal prosecutors. 79
But the Thornburgh Memorandum contained more specific and more
prescriptive language concerning both plea bargaining and (unlike the 198o
Principles) sentencing bargaining. On charging and charge bargaining, it
directed that "a federal prosecutor should initially charge the most serious,
readily provable offense or offenses consistent with the defendant's conduct.
Charges should not ... be abandoned in an effort to arrive at a bargain that
fails to reflect the seriousness of the defendant's conduct.",8 On sentencing,
Main Justice went even further in its instructions to prosecutors than the
Sentencing Commission had in its limitations on judges. Prosecutors were
instructed "only to stipulate to facts that accurately represent the defendant's
conduct" because Congress "could not have ... intended the reforms [it]
enacted to be limited to the small percentage of cases that go to trial." 8' A
slightly milder variant of this new national policy on bargaining of charges and
sentences was reissued by Attorney General Janet Reno in 1993.82 The Reno
Memorandum was left in place by the administration of President George W.
Bush until after Congress enacted the Feeney Amendment in 2003.83
The motivation behind these internal limits on prosecutorial charging
authority is uncertain. To be sure, credible voices from various quarters had
long called for either legislative or internal limits on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, in particular on prosecutors' charging discretion.84 It
is also likely that officials and others in Main Justice had become true believers
in the overriding mission of the Sentencing Reform Act, to achieve uniform
(and severe) sentences nationwide.
Assistant U.S. Attorney ... she would at least be sorely tempted, in some cases, to
disingenuously misrepresent the facts or her ability to prove the facts, in order to
manipulate the guideline computations to achieve a result that induces a defendant to plead
guilty.").
79. See supra note 36.
8o. Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Attorney Gen., to Federal Prosecutors (Mar. 13,
1989), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT'G REP. 347, 347 (1994).
Si. Id. at 348.
82. Janet Reno, Reno Bluesheet on Charging and Plea Decisions (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6
FED. SENT'G REP. 352 (1994).
83. See infra Part III.
84. See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 39, at 1522; see also supra note 48.
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But it is also true that the interests of the Department's leaders and
bureaucrats in implementing national sentencing policies are very different
from the interests of line prosecutors across the country, who face distinct
demands from law enforcement agents and judges, and from their own U.S.
Attorneys.8 s It would be consistent with the facts as we know them to conclude
that the Sentencing Guidelines presented Main Justice (abetted by Congress
and by critics of particular prosecutorial decisions) with an opportunity to
indulge a natural impulse to centralize control of all federal prosecution, an
impulse that continues to this day.
An early study of the Justice Department's response to the Guidelines
presciently recognized that the Department's actions "must ... be understood
in the context of an effort by those at the pinnacle of the criminal justice
pyramid ... to get those on the diffuse lower ranks, who have potentially
conflicting interests and agendas, to comply with centrally determined
policies."86 In the cause of aiding Congress and its Sentencing Commission in
their mission, Main Justice was able to assert for the first time not merely its
primacy in enunciating the general prosecutorial priorities of the Department,
but also its direct control of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion nationwide.
The project to achieve nationwide uniformity in sentencing, as represented by
the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines, became, from the perspective
of Main Justice, a project to achieve nationwide centralization of prosecutorial
power, as represented by the Thornburgh Memorandum and its successors.
We would do well to recognize that the Thornburgh Memorandum (and
later, those of Attorneys General Reno and Ashcroft) sought to centralize the
exercise of prosecutorial power essentially by delegitimating the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. The central command of these policies is that
prosecutors must apply the criminal law severely by charging "the most
serious, readily provable" offense in nearly every case. The federal criminal law
is generally not designed to serve such severe purposes; it has lesser-included
and overlapping offenses that are applicable to many sets of facts- and it fairly
cries out for the exercise of informed prosecutorial discretion. Perhaps it is
politically inevitable that if called upon to respond in one sentence to the
question, "What should prosecutors charge?", officials at Main Justice must
answer "the most serious charge available." (They can hardly answer, for
instance, "about half the most serious charge.")
But until the Feeney Amendment in 2003, no one actually asked the
Department this question, much less required it to issue a system-wide policy
85. See Richman, supra note 5, at 758-67.
86. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 47, at 253.
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related to charging under the Guidelines.8 7 Main Justice itself chose to issue
national policies on charging and sentencing, stimulated by the emergence of
the Sentencing Guidelines. If all federal prosecutors had abided by the
pronouncements from Main Justice, the result would have been a rigidity in
law enforcement wholly incompatible with the flexible and variable substantive
criminal law that Congress has enacted. Moreover, defendants in principle
would have been denied the opportunity to urge anyone-court or
prosecutor -to judge how the laws should be applied to the particular facts of
their case. 88 Finally, had prosecutors actually refused to exercise discretion in
charging and plea bargaining, it is quite possible that discretion would have
simply devolved to a lower (or earlier) stage in prosecution -law enforcement
agents.8 9
II. TAKING MEASURE OF THE GUIDELINES REGIME
Many interested observers of federal sentencing -including members of the
Sentencing Commission, officials in Main Justice, and, importantly, members
of Congress -have proceeded on the assumption that it is possible to measure
the extent to which the Guidelines have achieved nationwide uniformity by
looking at sentencing data from the federal courts; this data will tell observers
the extent to which judges have "complied" with the Guidelines and thereby
reduced sentencing disparity. The sentencing data compiled annually by the
Sentencing Commission appear to yield answers to a host of questions: Are
most sentences within the Guidelines range? Have sentencing judges properly
calculated that range? Where there is a departure from the Guidelines, is this
for a reason expressly sanctioned by the Guidelines themselves (for example,
pursuant to a motion from the government when a defendant has cooperated)?
How often are sentencing judges claiming there are grounds to depart? What
proportion of those cases is reversed on appeal? Do the decisions and case law
of the appellate courts demonstrate that they are living up to their obligation to
ensure that the Guidelines, as "law," are being followed by sentencing judges?
87. See infra Part III.
88. See Lynch, supra note 6, at 2124-27, 2148-49. For an example of how prosecutors in plea
bargains adjust the "facts" to the prosecutor's judgment of the culpability of the particular
defendant, see United States v. Palladino, 347 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2003). Palladino is further
discussed in infra note 1o8.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 103 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 1997) (raising the issue of
.sentencing manipulation" by law enforcement agents who control the extent and facts of
investigation).
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For most of its first decade, the federal Guidelines system seemed, by these
metrics, to be working as well as Congress and the Sentencing Commission
could realistically have expected. True, it was recognized on all fronts that
despite the proclamations of the Commission and Main Justice, federal
prosecutors exercised significant new powers to compel defendants to plead
guilty. Prosecutors were the gatekeepers for downward departures on the basis
of "substantial assistance" in the prosecution of others; cases with departures
on this basis accounted for between 15% and 20% of all sentencings each year. 90
And even beyond inducing "cooperation," it was widely understood that the
Guidelines were powerful bargaining chips for prosecutors. The percentage of
convictions by trial, as opposed to by guilty plea, fell from approximately 13%
in 1987 to just over 8% in 1996.91
Yet the case law and data from the lower federal courts seemed to reassure
that the reduction in criminal trials did not undermine the primary purpose of
the Sentencing Reform Act: to achieve sentencing uniformity and reduce inter-
judge disparity by applying the sentencing rules contained in Guidelines. The
data assiduously collected by the Sentencing Commission showed that within-
range Guidelines sentences were given in most cases (indeed, the great
majority of cases, setting aside sentences for cooperators), and that downward
departures from the Guidelines were only affirmed by the courts of appeals
when they were permitted by the Guidelines and the Sentencing Reform Act.
A. Sentencing Cases in the Courts ofAppeals
Given the asymmetry in the structure of the Guidelines (which contain
dozens of grounds requiring sentencing enhancement but provide for only two
9o. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, FIFrEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 103 (2004)
[hereinafter U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/i5_year/1syear.htm. Both Congress and the Sentencing Commission
accepted the propriety of below-Guidelines sentences for cooperators and accepted the
propriety of making the prosecutor the gatekeeper of 5K1 motions; as noted in the text,
defense attorneys could not make such a motion, and judges could not do so sua sponte.
91. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 16 tbl.io
(1997) [hereinafter U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK],
available at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1996/sourcbk.htm (91.7% of convictions obtained
by plea; 8.3% by trial). In 1987, approximately 870/o of convictions were obtained by plea of
guilty. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1988 SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 556 tbl.5 .28 (1989). Guilty plea rates after 1996 are discussed
in the text accompanying notes 132-133 infra.
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general mitigating adjustments), 92 as well as the severity of resulting
Guidelines sentences, it is not surprising that most departures have been
downward from the Guidelines sentencing range.93 Judging from the appellate
case law and data, most of these downward departures appeared to be in
compliance with the rules of the Sentencing Reform Act and of the Guidelines
themselves governing departures. The courts of appeals appeared to be doing
their duty to keep sentencing judges from deviating from the severity called for
by the Guidelines. The government appealed very few sentences, and when it
did appeal, it usually prevailed-for example, in 1996 winning remand in 85%
of its appeals of downward departures.94 Courts of appeals also remanded for
resentencing in a large majority of cases in which the government claimed the
sentencing judge had failed to apply an applicable Guidelines enhancement or
had erroneously applied a Guidelines mitigating factor. 95 Defendants, on the
other hand, seldom succeeded in appeals alleging that the sentence was higher
than that mandated by the Guidelines. 96 Although some circuits were surely
more deferential than others to district judges who departed,97 every court of
92. Compare U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, §§ 3Ai.1- 4 , 3B1.1, 3B1.3-
4, 3C1.1-2 (providing for upward adjustments), with id. 3B1.2 (providing for a downward
adjustment for minor or minimal role in offense), and id. § 3E1.1 (providing for a downward
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility)).
93. For instance, in 1996, there were 41,000 offenders sentenced in federal court; in only 388
cases were there upward departures, while there were 7845 downward departures on the
basis of cooperation with authorities in the prosecution of others, and 4201 other downward
departures. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 91, at 41 tbl.26.
94. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at 79
tbl.51. The government's appellate success rate remained high throughout the mandatory
Guidelines era. In fiscal year 2001, for instance, the government prevailed in 80% of the
cases in which it appealed downward departures. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2001
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 109 tbl. 58 (2002) [hereinafter U.S.
SENT'G COMM'N, 2001 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2oo/SBTOCo1.htm.
95. In 1996, the government prevailed in more than 6o% of all sentencing appeals that it took.
See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at 79
tbl.5i. In other years, the government's win percentage was even higher. See, e.g., U.S.
SENT'G COMM'N, 2001 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 94, at 1O9 tbl. 58
(showing that the government prevailed in over 80% of its sentencing appeals).
96. In 1996, only 8% of defense sentencing appeals were successful. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N,
1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at 78 tbl.5o (1997).
97. For instance, in 1996 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed 87.2% of
sentencing appeals, while the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed less than 70%.
See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at 75-
77 tbl.49.
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appeals seemed to take seriously its obligation to ensure that the Guidelines
sentence was properly calculated and that downward departures were limited
to those circumstances that the Sentencing Reform Act and the Commission
itself had specified as proper bases for below-Guidelines sentences.
As it turns out, however, appellate case law is a misleading marker of the
true state of the law on the ground. It is true that appellate courts have
affirmed most within-Guidelines sentences (and the relatively few instances of
above-Guidelines sentences), while vacating most below-Guidelines sentences.
But appellate decisions suffer from significant selection bias. The great
majority of criminal sentences are not appealed by either side. While most
federal defendants are indigent, and in this sense their appeals are "free," it has
often been a condition of plea agreements that defendants waive their right to
appeal, at least if the government does not breach its promises in the plea
agreement. 98 Even where there is not a waiver of appeal, a defendant who has
been the beneficiary of a less-than-strict application of the Guidelines has little
incentive to appeal, for doing so could induce a counter-productive cross-
appeal by the government. In both situations, the sentencing judge knows that
an appeal by the defendant is unlikely, and the absence of an appeal does not
necessarily mean that the judge "complied" with the Guidelines. In 1996, more
than 42,000 defendants were convicted in federal court, but fewer than 7000
appealed their sentences. 99
Still more intriguing is that the Government appealed even fewer
sentences, including where the sentencing judge explicitly departed downward
from the Guidelines for reasons other than cooperation with the government. In
1996, for instance, the government appealed a total of only 176 sentences.
Moreover, even though there were over 4000 downward departures that year
not on the basis of cooperation, the government appealed only thirty-two of
these.' Until implementation of the Feeney Amendment (discussed in Part
98. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55
DuE L.J. 209, 212 (2005) (finding that defendants waive appeal in nearly two-thirds of plea
agreements nationwide).
99. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at 78
tbl.5o, 40 tbl.24 n.1.
ioo. Id. at 40 tbls.24-25, 79 tbl.51. The paucity of government appeals of departures has persisted
throughout the Guidelines era. In 2000, for instance, judges departed downward in nearly
lo,ooo cases (excluding departures for cooperators), but the government appealed only 13 of
these and appealed only a total of 77 sentences on any basis, including incorrect application
of the Guidelines to the facts. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 53 tbl.26, lo9 tbl. 58 (2OO) [hereinafter U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2000
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III),1' each local U.S. Attorney's office was the initial gatekeeper in deciding
which sentencing cases to appeal. Moreover, this was only the beginning of the
appeals process. Every request for a sentencing appeal, like all other appeals,
must be approved by the Office of the Solicitor General in Main Justice. The
Department thus has the centralized capacity to shape sentencing law in the
courts of appeals by strategic exercise of its discretion to appeal."°2 That almost
all government sentencing appeals have been successful is consistent with the
strategy of appealing only those cases in which the government is most likely to
prevail.
The result throughout the Guidelines era (including after Booker)'03 has
been a body of circuit case law that on its face signals to district judges to
sentence as prescribed by the Guidelines. But this appellate doctrine overstates
the extent to which the Guidelines are, in fact, applied fully in sentencing
courts. Indeed, the real signal from the courts of appeals, as many sentencing
judges surely have realized from the beginning, is this: to avoid reversal,
impose a Guidelines sentence ifa non-Guidelines sentence is likely to be appealed.
Where the government and the defense counsel have stipulated to the relevant
Guidelines factors, or it is otherwise apparent to the sentencing judge that
neither side is disposed to appeal, the extent to which the sentence departs
from the Sentencing Guidelines cannot be observed by the appellate courts or
measured by outsiders.
B. Sentencing Data from the District Courts
Data related to actual sentencings likewise fail to provide a good measure of
Guidelines implementation and compliance. The data compiled by the
Sentencing Commission seemed to confirm (at least in the early years of the
Guidelines) that sentencing judges, under the watchful eyes of their court of
appeals colleagues, were complying with the rules the Sentencing Commission
had promulgated. In the great majority of cases, the sentences reported to the
Commission were consistent with the Guidelines calculation that the judge,
with the help of the probation officer, reported as applicable to the case at
hand. Moreover, most departures from the Guidelines were sponsored by the
government on the basis that the defendant had cooperated in the prosecution
of others -a departure basis explicitly grounded in both statutory law and the
iol. See infra text accompanying notes 198-201.
102. The Office of the Solicitor General must approve all government appeals, including sentence
appeals. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. A-roRNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 36, § 9-2.170.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 287-291 and note 287.
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Guidelines themselves. Even most noncooperation downward departures were
identified in judicial case reports as conforming to one of the Guidelines-
authorized bases for departure. 1°4 While the percentage of sentences departing
from the Guidelines varied greatly from district to district,' downward
departures not sponsored by the government for cooperators constituted less
than io% of all sentences during the early years of the Guidelines. °6 If there
was growing variance from the Guidelines, most of this was due to
prosecutors, not judges: the frequency of downward departures for cooperators
grew from less than 6% of all defendants sentenced in 1991 (the first year the
Guidelines were applied to a substantial number of cases) to over 19% by
1994.1°7
But these data do not actually show that judges gave a below-Guidelines
sentence in fewer than lO% of cases. First, there is the awkward fact, noted
above, that in another 20% of cases, the judge gave a below-Guidelines
sentence on the basis of the defendant's cooperation with authorities in the
prosecution of others. The Commission and other supporters of the Guidelines
regime have always considered these departures, which constitute the great
104. In 1996, for instance, nearly 20% of all sentences included departures downward from the
Guidelines on the basis of the defendant's cooperation with authorities, while only 10.3% of
sentences included downward departures on some other basis. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N,
1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at 41 tbl.26. (showing a 19.2%
rate of departures for cooperation with authorities in the prosecution of others; a 10.3% rate
of other downward departures; and a less than 1% rate of upward departures). The case
reports of noncooperation departures listed a variety of bases for giving a below-Guidelines
sentence, but "[p]ursuant to plea agreement" was listed in fewer than one-fifth of the cases.
Id. at 40 tbl.25.
los. See, e.g., U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 89 tbl. 31 (1995), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1995/intro95.pdf (noting that the downward departure rate on
the basis of cooperation in the Southern District of New York was 18%, in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, 42%, and in the Central District of California, less than 7,0/o;
noncooperation downward departure rates for these districts were, respectively, io%, 6%,
and 4%).
1o6. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES 32 fig.1 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DOwNwARD DEPARTURES]
(showing noncooperation downward departures growing from 5.8% of all cases in 1991 to
8.4% in 1995). In 1996, the percentage of cases with noncooperation downward departures
grew to 10.3%, see id.; U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 91, at 41 tbl.z6. The continual growth in noncooperation downward departures
during the decade of the 199os is discussed infra text accompanying notes 135-151, 164-168.
107. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DowNwARD DEPARTURES, supra note 1o6, at 32 fig.i; see also U.S.
SENT'G COMM'N, 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at 39 fig.G.




HeinOnline -- 117 Yale L.J. 1448 2007-2008
THE ARC OF THE PENDULUM
majority of below-Guidelines sentences, to be as good as within-Guidelines
sentences for purposes of measuring "compliance"; in point of fact, however,
in nearly one-fifth of cases, the judge was released (at the behest of the
prosecutor) of any obligation to give a Guidelines sentence. There is a second
and more subtle reason to doubt that the Guidelines were ever implemented to
the extent reported by the Commission in its annual publication of sentencing
data: the Commission's data on departures only reveal the sentences judges
acknowledge, or even know, vary from the sentence that full application of the
Guidelines would require. If judges are not advised of all the aggravating
factors arguably present in a case - because the parties have agreed implicitly or
explicitly not to advise the court of certain matters -then, unbeknownst to the
judge herself, her report that she imposed a "Guidelines sentence" is not
entirely accurate. Similarly, even if the judge is aware that there may be
additional aggravating facts beyond those alleged by the prosecutor or those
stated in the plea agreement, the judge may have little incentive to press an
issue that neither party has raised and that ultimately could lead the defendant
to seek to withdraw his plea of guilty."S
The insertion of the probation officer into the Guidelines calculation and
application process at first appeared to be a procedure that would genuinely
confound the natural instinct of prosecutors and defense attorneys to settle
their cases somewhere below the sentence called for by full and rigorous
application of the Guidelines. Within several years, however, it became clear
that in most cases where the government and the defense agreed on the
Guidelines calculation-or agreed to most of the calculation, leaving open
perhaps one or two issues on which there might be the need for judicial fact-
finding after an adversary hearing-neither the probation officer nor the judge
had any incentive or evidence to upset the agreement that the litigants
presented. Especially because Guidelines sentences are severe -as compared to
state sentences for similar conduct, pre-Guidelines federal sentences, and
sentences in most other countries for similar crimes- few judges had a reason
or desire to inquire behind the "fact bargain" underlying a plea.' 9 Judges may
io8. Indeed, where the government fact-bargains to a sentence below what the Guidelines
require, it may be held to the bargain even when additional facts become known to the
court. See, e.g., United States v. Palladino, 347 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2003). In this case, the plea
agreement did not mention that there was an arguable basis under the Guidelines for six-
level enhancement of the offense level; however, when the probation officer asked about the
matter, the government presented information confirming its factual basis, and the
sentencing judge applied the enhancement. The court of appeals vacated the sentence
because the government had indicated in the plea agreement that it would not present facts
warranting sentence enhancement beyond that specified in the agreement.
log. See Garoppolo, supra note 78, at 405-07.
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have decided that the bargain reflected, or did not reflect, a perfect application
of the Guidelines, or they may have simply not considered that question
important.
To be sure, the Thornburgh Memorandum and Reno Memorandum from
Main Justice did implicitly prohibit "fact bargaining" without using the
term.11° But this departmental policy was not enforceable for two reasons, one
practical and the other conceptual. The practical problem was that there was no
mechanism to monitor the exercise of discretion by individual line
prosecutors."' Only with respect to one set of cases-those that are death-
eligible-has Main Justice been able to expend the resources necessary to
enforce its requirement that the discretionary charging decision (whether to
seek a death sentence) be made centrally in accordance with Department-wide
criteria."2 Apart from capital cases, there was and is no way to review every
charging decision and every plea agreement by every Assistant U.S. Attorney in
the nation. There may well come a day when Main Justice fully takes control of
all charging discretion, but that day has not yet come.
An early study, based on in-depth interviews with prosecutors, concluded
that the Guidelines application urged by prosecutors did not fully apply
Guidelines enhancement factors in approximately one-third of cases."3 As
explored elsewhere," 4 this number in all likelihood underestimates the true
extent of "fact bargaining" over sentencing. As one experienced probation
officer noted over a decade ago, "The widespread use of fact bargaining, and
11o. See supra notes 8o, 82. After the Feeney Amendment, Main Justice explicitly forbade "fact
bargaining." See Memorandum from Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft 3 (July 28, 2003), reprinted in
15 FED. SENT'G REP. 375, 376 (2003). The memo is discussed in the text accompanying notes
194-195 infra.
mn. See Michael Edmund O'Neill, When Prosecutors Don't: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial
Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221, 227-31 (2003); Mark Osler, This Changes
Everything: A Callfor a Directive, Goal-Oriented Principle To Guide the Exercise of Discretion by
Federal Prosecutors, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 625, 633-40 (2005).
im. Under Attorney General Janet Reno, the death penalty could not be sought unless the U.S.
Attorney requested and obtained approval from Main Justice in a statutorily death-eligible
case. Under Attorney General Ashcroft, the entire process was centralized. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, U.S. ATroRNEYs' MANUAL, supra note 36, §§ 9- lo .010 to 1o.19o; id. 5 9-1o.o8o
("The United States Attorney must submit to the Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division every case in which an indictment has been or will be obtained that
charges an offense punishable by death or alleges conduct that could be charged as an offense
punishable by death." (emphasis added)).
113. Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
501 (1992).
114. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 140. See generally id. at 116-40.
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the lying to the court that is inevitable with the frequent use of such
bargaining, is the dirty little secret" of the Guidelines era. ' Another long-time
probation officer conducted a nationwide survey that found that in two-thirds
of the ninety-four federal districts, the prosecutor and defense counsel included
Guidelines stipulations in their plea agreements, and that only 20% of the
surveyed officers believed the stipulations were accurate more than 8o% of the
time.n
6
The deeper, conceptual problem with attempting to measure Guidelines
"compliance" is that the whole enterprise of prohibiting "fact bargaining" -
and, relatedly, of insisting that the judge sentence on the basis of the "actual
facts" of the case - is largely incoherent. In litigation, there are no 'facts" except
those that can be demonstrated in court to the relevant standard ofproof.
Who is to say that the facts marshaled by the probation officer, the
prosecutor, or the investigating agent are the "actual" facts-to use the
terminology of the Guidelines' mandate to sentencing judges ?117 The whole
notion that there are "actual" facts that can be found by a judge apart from
litigation is based on a naive or incomplete understanding of the adjudicatory
process."' Even in the case of most cooperating defendants who receive 5K1
motions allowing the judge to depart below the Guidelines, all we really can
conclude is that the parties have agreed to this disposition; we cannot conclude
that the measure of "cooperation" has been consistently applied by particular
prosecutors or U.S. Attorneys' offices, much less that application has been
uniform across the nation.11 9
The most sophisticated studies of Guidelines sentences suggest that they
have not had much success in achieving their primary purpose, which was to
reduce inter-judge disparity. These same studies therefore leave uncertain the
11s. Garoppolo, supra note 78, at 405.
n6. Letter from Francesca D. Bowman, Chair, Prob. Officers Advisory Group to the U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n, to Richard P. Conaboy, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Jan. 30,
1996), reprinted in 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 1,303-04 (1996).
17. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
118. In some cases, the participants at the sentencing hearing do dispute the existence of "actual
facts," and the judge holds a hearing or otherwise undertakes a process to determine the
facts under the applicable standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence, in the case of a
sentencing hearing). In these circumstances, the Commission's mandate that the judge
apply the Guidelines rules to "the facts" has some meaning, for observers can at least judge
whether the sentence, given the facts found by the judge, complies with the Guidelines,
though even in these cases judges of course have some discretionary leeway in both fact-
finding and rule-application.
i19. In fact, the incidence of 5Ki motions for prosecutors varies greatly among districts. See supra
note 90.
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extent to which it can be concluded that sentences have "complied" with the
Guidelines. We do well to recall that reexamination of the pre-Guidelines
empirical studies that purported to show significant (and race-based) disparity
in federal sentencing revealed the inadequacy of data on which these claims
were based. 2' Similarly, the best post-Guidelines empirical studies do not
support the claim that the Guidelines (or even the Guidelines in conjunction
with the contemporaneous phenomena of mandatory minimum sentences for
drug crimes) have significantly reduced judicial disparity in sentencing. One
study published in 1999 was based on the "natural experiment" of random
distribution of cases within districts and showed that inter-judge disparity fell
only from an average of approximately five months pre-Guidelines to an
average of approximately four months post-Guidelines. The study warned that
even this reduction in inter-judge disparity might be attributable not to the
Guidelines themselves, but to statutory mandatory minimum (and thus more
uniform) sentences in drug cases, which account for some 40% of the federal
docket nationwide. 2' A similar study conducted by statisticians at the
Sentencing Commission yielded a similar result. 2  Another study,
hypothesizing that the identity of the sentencing judge should matter less post-
Guidelines than pre-Guidelines, found that judge-specific effects actually
increased under the Guidelines.2 3
Did judges apply the Guidelines uniformly and accurately to "the facts"?
We have very little empirical basis for an answer to that question, and in an
important sense do not even know what the question means. But the
Sentencing Commission apparently continues to believe that the question is
meaningful, and that the answer, for at least the first years of the Guidelines
regime, was "Yes.""
120. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 105-12.
121. James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity:
Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. &ECON. 271, 299 (1999).
122. Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell & R. Barry Ruback, Criminology: The Effect of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 9o J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239
(1999).
123. Chantale Lacasse & Abigail A. Payne, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum
Sentences: Do Defendants Bargain in the Shadow of the Judge?, 42 J.L. & ECON. 245, 267 (1999)
(arguing that the identity of the judge explained more sentencing variance post-Guidelines
than pre-Guidelines).
124. In addition to the Commission's annual reports on federal sentencing statistics, see, for
example, the Commission's "five-year" report, which concludes that the Guidelines had
achieved "significant reductions in disparity and the desired increases in uniformity." U.S.
SENT'G COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF
117:1420 20o8
HeinOnline -- 117 Yale L.J. 1452 2007-2008
THE ARC OF THE PENDULUM
C. Measuring Other Consequences of the Guidelines
The extent to which the Guidelines succeeded in their primary goal -
reducing sentencing disparity among judges -is difficult if not impossible to
measure, but it is clear enough that they succeeded in their secondary goal:
increasing sentences in most crime categories. 2 ' The percentage of defendants
sentenced to probation fell from 50% pre-Guidelines to less than 15% post-
Guidelines. 26 Despite this overall increase in imprisonment, the average prison
sentence also increased, from twenty-eight months in 1986, pre-Guidelines, to
an average of fifty months between 1989 and 1996.127 The increased severity of
federal criminal sentences is too great to be explained only by changes in the
nature of criminal caseloads (from less serious to more serious crimes).
Moreover, the increase in sentence severity took effect as soon as the
Guidelines were widely implemented, with no indication of a parallel sudden
change in the nature of federal prosecutions." 8
The Guidelines and the concomitant enactment of mandatory minimum
sentences had other significant effects. One that has been widely noted is the
reduction in the frequency of federal criminal trials.2 9 Before the Guidelines,
more than 12% of federal offenders were convicted by trial; 3 ' by 1996, the
THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF
INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA-BARGAINING 85 (1991).
125. See supra note 42; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note i, at 42, 59-63 (noting that
increasing sentencing severity for violent and white-collar crimes was a secondary goal of
the Sentencing Reform Act and a deliberate Commission policy choice, despite the
Commission's claim that the Guidelines were based on average "past practice").
126. Compare U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at
21 tbl.12 (11.5% of offenders sentenced to probation only), with U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1989
ANNUAL REPORT app. B, tbl.B-7 (1989) (showing approximately 50% of offenders sentenced
to probation in the years 1984-1988).
127. Because of parole, the time actually served in the pre-Guidelines period was even lower than
the twenty-eight month average sentence. For data and analysis, see STITH & CABRANES,
supra note 1, at 62-65.
128. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 68-9 tbl.24 (1991). By 1991, the first year in
which the Guidelines were applicable to a large majority of cases, the mean sentence had
grown to sixty-five months. Id.
iz9. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154
U. PA. L. REv. 79 (2005). But see Daniel Richman, Judging Untried Cases, 156 U. PA. L. REv.
219, 219 (2007) (questioning whether the reduced incidence of trials is as problematic as
suggested by Wright).
130. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1987 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 442 tbl.5.22
(1988).
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percentage was just over 8%;'"' and since 2000 it has been less than 5%.32
Indeed, throughout the period of "mandatory" Guidelines, guilty pleas steadily
displaced trials in the federal system. Those who have studied this
phenomenon quite reasonably attribute it to "the adoption of new sentencing
laws that have greatly enhanced the plea-bargaining leverage enjoyed by
prosecutors." 33
The result is, as Judge Gerard E. Lynch famously observed a decade ago,
that at least in the federal courts we have not an "adversary" system of justice,
but an "administrative" system. 34 Since prosecutorial discretion and plea
bargains control most outcomes, the system as it actually operates relies on
both the priorities and the judgments of prosecutors. The default is the plea
bargain (or sentence bargain), with the adversarial jury trial serving as a kind
of judicial review for defendants who are not content with administrative
adjudication by the prosecutor.
131. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at 15 fig.C.
132. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 20 fig.C
(2003) [hereinafter U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2002 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK],
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2oo2/SBTOCo2.htm (showing that rates of
conviction by trial fell from 6.4% in 1998 to 2.9% in 2002); U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2007
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 22 fig.C (2008) [hereinafter U.S. SENT'G
COMM'N, 2007 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/2oo7/SBTOCo7.htm (showing that the rate of convictions by trial was 4.2% in
2007, and averaged below 5% for the years 2003 through 2006).
133. Michael M. O'Hear, What's Good About Trials?, 156 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 209, 211
(2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-20o7/OHear.pdf; see also Gary T.
Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate
Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 78 (1993) (explaining that the threat of filing a charge
with a mandatory minimum sentence "pressure[s] defendants, who otherwise might test
the state's evidence, into accepting guilty pleas"); Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer,
Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 137, 137 (1995) (contending that the Guidelines give prosecutors "greater leverage to
virtually compel plea bargaining, force cooperation, and in essence determine the length of
sentences"); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REv. 2548, 2551-54 (2004) (discussing how the costs of going to trial affect plea
bargaining); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 132 (2004); Mary Pat Flaherty & Joan Biskupic, Prosecutors Can
Stack the Deck, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1996, at Ai (describing cases in which the maximum
sentence imposed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines influenced a defendant's decision to
plea bargain); Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, Editorial, Prosecutor Rex, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Dec. 19, 2003, at A39 (suggesting that wide margins between sentences after
trials and sentences after plea bargains can unduly sway defendants toward plea bargains).
134. Lynch, supra note 6, at 2218; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L.
REv. 715 (2005); Richman, supra note 76.
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III. THE CHALLENGE OF THE FEENEY AMENDMENT
While one cannot know the "true" extent to which the Guidelines are
applied, or even what "true" might mean in this context, it may still be
worthwhile to undertake a longitudinal analysis of changes in the frequency of
Guidelines departures and the severity of Guidelines sentences. For instance, if
one makes the (admittedly unrealistic) assumption that the types of cases and
the state of the governing criminal law, including the content of the
Guidelines, remain constant, then changes in raw numbers of departures and
in average sentence over time may offer at least a window on changes in actual
judicial sentencing practice. Moreover, such data might provide a rough
measure of the effects of exogenous changes in the law, such as the Supreme
Court's Koon decision in 1996, the Feeney Amendment enacted by Congress in
2003, and, of course, the Booker decision in 2005.
The raw data, set forth in Figure 1, are startling. The frequency of
noncooperation downward departures grew throughout the 199os, from under
7% in the early 199os to nearly 20% in 2001-the last year for which Congress
had data when it enacted the Feeney Amendment.' This growth was
particularly pronounced after the Supreme Court handed down the Koon
decision (enunciating an "abuse-of-discretion" standard for appellate review of
departures) in 1996.136 Even as the rate of government-sponsored downward
departures for cooperators decreased slightly (from nearly 20% in 1995 to just
over 17% in 2001), the rate of other downward departures more than doubled,
from 8.5% in 1995 to over 18% in 2001. Then, in the wake of both the 2003
Feeney Amendment and the threat of the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee
of the House of Representatives, F. James Sensenbrenner, to investigate all the
135. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES, supra note 1o6, at 32; see also U.S. SENT'G
COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL
SENTENCING 51 fig.' (2006) [hereinafter U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, BOOKER FINAL REPORT]
(showing that total noncooperation departures grew from io% in 1991 to close to 20% in
2001). The data reported by the Commission are by fiscal year, with the fiscal year
beginning three months prior to the calendar year (i.e., fiscal year 2001 began on October 1,
20oo, and ended on September 30, 2001).
136. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99-1oo (1996). Koon was decided on June 13, 1996;
hence the percentages shown for FY1996 in Figure 1 include both pre- and post-Koon
sentencings.
137. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DOwNwARD DEPARTURES, supra note io6, at 32. It turns out that the
rate of noncooperation downward departures actually peaked in FY200, though Congress
did not have FY2o02 data available when it promulgated the Feeney Amendment. See U.S.
SENT'G COMM'N, BOOKER FINAL REPORT, supra note 135, at D-io (showing that
noncooperation downward departures fell from 18.3% in 2001 to 16.8% in FY2o02).
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sentences of a judge who had testified that Guidelines sentences were too
severe,' 38 the percentage of noncooperation downward departures fell to
approximately 13% in 2003 and 2004. 39 Since Booker (in 2005), the percentage
of below-Guidelines sentences for reasons other than noncooperation has risen
to over 23%.14' Figure 1 illustrates these trends.
138. On May 14, 2002, Judge James Rosenbaum of the District of Minnesota testified concerning
his experience with Guidelines sentences for narcotics offenses; for months thereafter
Chairman Sensenbrenner and members of his staff heaped harsh criticism on the judge and
issued repeated threats of further investigation. See Tresa Baldas, Congress Comes After a
Federal Judge: Sentencing at Issue in Subpoena Uproar, NAT'L L.J., at Al (Mar. 24, 2003) ("In
an unprecedented and controversial move that has judges nationwide expressing concern,
the House Judiciary Committee threatened to issue subpoenas for records relating to
Rosenbaum's sentencing decisions, and has requested a federal review of the entire
Minnesota federal bench as part of a broader inquiry .... "). The Chairman's actions were
widely understood to be an attempt to ensure that judges would hew closely to the
Guidelines. See Robert Moilana, Op-Ed., Judge Rosenbaum's Trial by Intimidation,
MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL Bus. J., June 11, 2004, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/
twincities/stories/20o4/o6/14/editorial2.html; Todd David Peterson, Oh, Behave:
Congressman's Recent Efforts To Punish Federal Judges Flout the Constitution; It Says So in the
Good Behavior Clause, LEGAL ArE., Nov./Dec. 2005, at 16, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-20o5/toa-novdeco5.msp; David
Rubenstein, Rosenbaum's Inquisition, NATION, Dec. i, 2003, at 6, available at
http://www.thenation.con-/doC/2oo31229/rubenstein.
139. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 79-yellow
pages tbl.26A, 79-blue pages tbl.27A (2005) [hereinafter U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2004
SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/20o4/
SBTOCo4.htm (showing that the downward departure rate, other than for cooperators, was
-under 12% in first part of FY2003, and that the rate grew slightly after Blakely v. Washington
was handed down in June 2004).
140. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, BOOKER FINAL REPORT, supra note 135, at D-io (showing that in the
first year after Booker was handed down, cooperation departures were given in 14.4% of
cases, below-Guidelines sentences on other bases were given in 21.8% of all cases, and
above-Guidelines sentences doubled to a total of 1.5% of all cases). In FY2007, 23.2% of
sentences were below the Guidelines for reasons other than cooperation with authorities.
U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2007 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 132, at 70-71
tbl.26.
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Figure i.
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The trendlines in Figure 1 are misleading, however, because many of the
noncooperation downward departures were in fact sponsored by the
141. The data from which Figure I was constructed are from the Commission's annual reports on
sentencing: U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 139 tbl. 55 (1991); U.S. SENT'G
COMM'N, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 127 tbl.5o (1992); U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1993 ANNUAL
REPORT 161 tbl.66 (1993); U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 83 tbl.33 (1994);
U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1o5, at 89 tbl. 3 1; U.S. SENT'G
COMM'N, 1996 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 91, at 41 tbl.26; U.S.
SENT'G COMM'N, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 53 tbl.26 (1998),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1997/sbtoc97.htm; U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1998
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 53 tbl.26 (1999), available at htrp://
www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1998/Sbtoc98.htm; U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 53 tbl.26 (2000), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/I999/Sbtoc9 9 .htm; U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2000 SENTENCING STATISTICS
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1OO, at 53 tbl.26; U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2001 SENTENCING
STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 94, 53 tbl.26; U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2002 SENTENCING
STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 132, at 53 tbl.26; U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2003
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 57 tbl.26 (2004), available at http://
www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2oo3/SBTOCo3.htm; U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2004 SENTENCING
STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 139, at 72 tbl.26, 75 tbl.26A, 278 tbl.26, 281 tbl.26A;
U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 74 tbl.26, 77
tbl.26A, 286 tbl.26 (20o6), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2oos/
SBTOCos.htm; U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 74-75 tbl.26 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2oo6/
SBTOCo6.htm; U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2007 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 132, at 70-71 tbl.26. A Fiscal Year begins on October 1 of the preceding year. United
States v. Koon was decided at the end of Q3 of FY1996. The Feeney Amendment was enacted
in 0.3 of FY2003. United States v. Booker was decided at the beginning of Q2 of FY2oos.
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government. As the Sentencing Commission concluded in a report that it
issued after Feeney was enacted,'" and as Max Schanzenbach has
demonstrated in a subsequent empirical analysis,'43 the increase in departures
throughout the 199os is due in part to the increasing proportion of
immigration cases in the federal criminal caseload in border districts, in which
the government moved for downward departures (apparently because of the
large and growing number of such cases, and in order to hasten
deportation).'" Main Justice had approved this so-called fast-track treatment
of immigration cases prior to Feeney-and the Feeney Amendment itself
transformed this policy into a statutory mandate requiring "fast-track"
treatment of immigration offenders where proposed by the government. 14s
Prior to 2003, the Sentencing Commission did not keep data on the extent
to which noncooperation downward departures were in fact initiated or
sponsored by the government for reasons other than cooperation. In 2003,
however, the Commission undertook a reexamination of 20Ol data and
concluded that, while slightly more than 18% of cases had a downward
departure for reasons other than the defendant's cooperation, approximately
40% of these were explicitly agreed to by the government, primarily in plea
agreements or pursuant to a "fast-track" program in districts with a high
incidence of immigration offenses. 4 6 The Commission's analysis thus
concluded that the rate of true (nongovernment-initiated) judicial departures
in 2001 was just under 11%,147 as shown in Figure 2. Drawing also upon data
142. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES, supra note lo6. The Feeney Amendment
had required the Commission to issue a comprehensive report on departures and its efforts
to reduce the frequency of noncooperation downward departures. See id. at i ("The United
States Sentencing Commission submits this report in direct response to section 401(m) of
... [the 'PROTECT Act'], and as part of its overall fifteen year review of the federal
sentencing guidelines.").
143. Max Schanzenbach, Have Federal Judges Changed Their Sentencing Practices? The Shaky
Empirical Foundations of the Feeney Amendment, 2 J. EMp. L. STUD. 1, 17-38 (2005).
144. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DowNwARD DEPARTURES, supra note io6, at 51-61;
Schanzenbach, supra note 143, at 22-28.
145. See Pub. L. No. lO8-21, § 4o1(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 994 note); see also infra note 186.
146. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES, supra note lo6, at 59-60; 60 fig.15.
Following the Commission's methodology, Figure 2's "Government-sponsored below-
Guidelines" sentences include not only departures for cooperation, but also downward
departures based on plea bargains, the government's "fast-track" program for immigration
cases in border districts, and cases where the offender was deported.
147. See id. at v ("If all the government initiated departures are excluded, the remaining
downward departure rate [for 2001] is estimated to be about 1o.9 percent."); U.S. SENT'G
COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 90, at ill ("The rate of downward departures
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from the Commission's subsequent annual data reports, Figure 2 shows the
rates of different types of non-Guidelines sentences through 2007.
for reasons other than substantial assistance that were not initiated by the government [as
part of early disposition program or plea agreement] appeared to be approximately 10.9
percent in 2001.").
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Figure 2.
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148. The sources for the percentages shown for FY2003 to FY2o0 7 are listed in note 141, supra;
for these years, the Commission disaggregated downward departures, providing data for
both cooperation departures and "other government-sponsored" departures. The FY2001
percentage of "Government-sponsored below-Guidelines" sentences is from U.S. SENT'G
COMM'N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES, supra note io6, at 32 fig.i, and 60 fig.15; U.S. SENT'G
COMM'N, BOOKER FINAL REPORT, supra note 135, at 53 n.265; id. at 55, fig.2 (adding the
"substantial assistance departures" and "government-initiated departures" data from the
Downward Departures Report to obtain government-sponsored downward departure
figures for FY2ool and FY2002). I calculated the 2002 percentage by applying the
assumptions of the Downward Departures Report-namely, that one-quarter of "general
mitigating circumstances" departures and all plea bargained, fast-tracked, and deportation-
related sentences are "government-sponsored"-to the Commission's annual report data
pertaining to FY2002. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES, supra note 1o6,
at 59-60; U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2002 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 132,
at 51, fig.G; id. at 52, tbl.25 . Fiscal Year begins on October i of the preceding year. The
Feeney Amendment was enacted in 03 of FY2003. United States v. Booker was decided at the
beginning of Q2 of FY200 5 .
The percentages shown for FY20ol and FY2oo2 should be treated with caution.
Perhaps most importantly, the Commission sometimes ascribed more than one reason for a
downward departure. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DowNwARD DEPARTURES, supra note 1O6,
at 42 fig.11; U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2002 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note
132, at 52 tbl.25 n.2. As a result, certain numbers in the Commission's reports-such as the
number of cases involving fast-track and deportation departures -may be inflated due to
double counting. Moreover, the Commission's finding that one-quarter of "general
mitigating circumstances" departures in FY2001 were government-sponsored is based on a
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Schanzenbach's analysis similarly concluded '49 that controlling for changes
in the nature of prosecutions (using the calculated Guidelines sentencing range
as a proxy) and controlling for district effects (especially pronounced in border
districts with a high proportion of immigration cases) results in a less startling
trend line: true judicial downward departures rose by less than one-third
between 1996 and 2001."'0 When he also excluded from his analysis all cases
with plea bargains, Schanzenbach estimated that the rate of noncooperation
downward departures grew only slightly between 1996 and 2001. '
In the single legislative hearing held on the Feeney Amendment, Main
Justice argued" 2 that the increase in downward departures throughout the
199os was due in large part to the failure of the courts of appeals to enforce the
Guidelines, and that this failure had been exacerbated by the standard of
149. Schanzenbach's methodology is econometric, while the Commission examined the details of
a sample of past downward departures to determine the percentage that were initiated by
the government. Because the methodologies used by the Commission and by Schanzenbach
are different, their analyses yield slightly different percentages of non-Guidelines sentences.
The data set used by Schanzenbach ended in 2OOi and hence he did not address the effect of
Feeney in 2003 or Booker in 2005.
15o. Schanzenbach, supra note 143, at 24 fig.l. After controlling for these factors, the
noncooperation downward departure rate was approximately 13% in FY1996, and grew to
170/o in FY2001. Schanzenbach concluded, "there is no doubt that downward departures
increased [after Koon], but they did not do so to the extent suggested by proponents of the
Feeney Amendment." Id. at 26. In his narrative analysis, Schanzenbach uses the data from
FY19 96 as the benchmark to measure the effect of Koon, see id. at 22-38. However, Koon was
decided in June 1996, during the 1996 fiscal year used by the Commission in its data
reports, see supra note 135; hence the data reported for FY1996 include cases decided after
Koon. Schanzenbach's analysis reveals a greater increase in judicial downward departures if
the benchmark year is FY1995. See id. at 24 fig.1 (showing, after controlling for caseload and
district effects, noncooperation departures grew from under 12% in FY199 5 to
approximately 17/. in FY2001).
is. See id. at 25 fig.3 (excluding plea bargains, as well as controlling for caseload and district, the
noncooperation departure rate was just under 13% in FY1996, and grew to approximately
15% in FY2001). Using Schanzenbach's own methodology, the impact of Koon would appear
greater if FY1995 data are treated as the benchmark, as is arguably more appropriate. See
Schanzenbach, supra note 143, at 25 fig.3 (eliminating all cases with plea bargains and
removing caseload and district effects, Schanzenbach's methodology yields a
noncooperation departure rate of 9% in FY1995, rising to nearly 13% in FY1996); supra note
150.
152. See Child Abduction Prevention Act and the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of
2003: Hearing on H.R. 11o4 and H.R. 1161 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the jndiciary, io8th Cong. i-i8 (2003) (statement of
Daniel P. Collins, Assistant Deputy Att'y Gen.) [hereinafter Statement of Daniel P. Collins];
see also William W. Mercer, Assessing Compliance with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: The
Significance of Improved Data Collection and Reporting, 16 FED. SENT'G. REP. 43 (2003).
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review for departures set forth in Koon-review for "abuse of discretion." ' 3
The Department supported adding language to the Sentencing Reform Act
that "would effectively overrule Koon," 4 which was a unanimous decision
authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy."'5 As I have previously suggested, and
as the implementation of that standard in the Koon case itself made clear, ,
6
153. Koonv. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99-1oo (1996).
1s4. Statement of Daniel P. Collins, supra note 152, at 18.
155. In addition to announcing that departures should be reviewed under an "abuse-of-
discretion" standard, Koon also spoke approvingly of the "heartland" approach to departures
that the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had adopted when Stephen Breyer served on
that court, see United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (ist Cir. 1989), although this
aspect of Koon apparently was of lesser concern to Representative Feeney, Main Justice, and
other supporters of the Feeney Amendment. While a generous understanding of the
"heartland" approach might allow departure in any atypical case, the case law of the courts
of appeals, even those that ostensibly accepted the "heartland" approach to departures, did
not, for the most part, signal a more lenient standard for departures, upward or downward,
after Koon. See, e.g., United States v. Hemmingson, 157 F.3 d 347, 359 (5th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Hoffer, 129 F.3 d 1196, 12o6 (iith Cir. 1997); United States v. Weaver, 126 F.3d 789,
790 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting harsh treatment of minor white-collar offenders as a basis for
departure since all white-collar offenders are included in the heartland); United States v.
Wong, 127 F. 3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing a departure and rejecting a host of factors
including disparity among co-defendants, cost of imprisonment, lack of judicial sentencing
discretion, crack-versus-powder-cocaine sentencing disparities, low recidivism risk, and the
absence of a weapon during a violent crime); see also United States v. Bonnet-Grullon, S3 F.
Supp. 2d 430, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (rejecting interdistrict sentencing disparity as the basis
for downward departure), affd 212 F.3d 692 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Snyder, 954 F.
Supp. 19 (D. Mass. 1997), rev'd and remanded, 136 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting
federal/state sentencing disparity as a basis for a downward departure); United States v.
Brennick, 949 F. Supp. 32 (D. Mass. 1996), vacated and remanded, 134 F.3d 1O (1st. Cir.
1998); Francesca D. Bowman, Has Koon Undermined the Guidelines?, 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 32,
32 (1996) (reviewing statistics from the District of Massachusetts, and concluding that Koon
is not "undermining the guidelines at this point"); Kate Stith & Jos6 A. Cabranes, Judging
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1247, 1277-82 (1997). A few
circuits did, at least on occasion, more aggressively implement the heartland concept. See,
e.g., United States v. Leahy, 169 F.3d 433, 44o (7 th Cit. 1999) (relying heavily on Koon and
the heartland concept to hold that "most, but not all, of the conduct regulated by those
statutory provisions explicitly referenced would be considered 'typical' and within the
'heartland' of cases covered by that guideline. By implication, cases embodying conduct
regulated by statutory provisions that are not referenced by a particular guideline logically
cannot be found to fall within the 'heartland' of that particular guideline."); United States v.
Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556 (9 th Cir. 1998); United States v. Woods, 159 F.3d 1132,
1134 (8th Cit. 1998) (holding that "because the underlying offense was bankruptcy fraud,
and not drug trafficking or some other offense typical of organized crime, the facts of her
money laundering did not fall into the 'heartland' of cases involving that offense").
156. See Stith, supra note 25, at 15 (noting that despite using the "abuse of discretion" standard,
the Court in Koon had vacated the sentence and held that certain bases the sentencing judge
had relied on for departure were unlawful).
1462
117:1420 20o8
HeinOnline -- 117 Yale L.J. 1462 2007-2008
THE ARC OF THE PENDULUM
review of departures for "abuse of discretion" in fact does not liberate
sentencing judges to depart in a regime that by law limits departures." 7 Since
the Guidelines limited the allowable bases for departure,1 8 the "abuse of
discretion" standard amounted to something close to the usual judicial review
for legal error. Although the Department of Justice complained at the hearing
on the Feeney Amendment that the reason it had appealed only twenty-five
downward departure decisions in 2001 was Koon's lenient review standard,l"9
the Department had consistently appealed only a tiny percentage of downward
departures even prior to Koon. 6 Moreover, in 2001, the government appealed
very few sentences (with or without departures) on any basis, 6 ' as had been its
practice throughout the Guidelines era.
Still, as noted in Part II, the appellate legal regime is only one factor among
many affecting the behavior of sentencing judges. Schanzenbach's analysis,
even after controlling for caseload and district effects, shows that the
percentage of cases with downward departures for reasons other than
cooperation with the government grew significantly -by nearly one-third or by
one-half, depending on whether 1995 or 1996 is used as the benchmark year.62
This increase in the frequency of judicial downward departures may have been
a response to the norm-setting signal to district courts and to prosecutors that the
1S7. See Zervos v. Verizon, 252 F. 3d 163, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining the relationship
between "abuse of discretion" and "legal error"); cf. Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in
Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right To Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REv.
1 (199o) (discussing the abuse of discretion standard). For an extended appraisal of the
meaning and impact of Koon, see Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin'
Heart(land): The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723
(1999).
158. See supra note 23.
159. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES, supra note io6, at 54-56 (summarizing the
Department's position); see id. at 56 (noting that the government appealed downward
departures in a total of twenty-five cases, prevailing in more than three-fourths of these).
16o. See supra Section II.A; see also U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DowNwARD DEPARTURES, supra note
io6, at 56 n.117 (noting that the government appealed an average of thirty-eight downward
departures per year in the four years prior to Koon).
161. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2001 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 94, at lo9
tbl.58 (noting that the government appealed on a sentencing issue in only 94 cases,
prevailing in 70% of these); see also Paul Hofer, Willie Martin & Pamela Montgomery,
Departure Rates and Reasons After Koon v. United States, 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 284 (1997).
162. Schazenbach, supra note 143, at 24 fig.1. After controlling for changes in offense
characteristics and district effects, noncooperation downward departures grew from just
over 11% of cases in FY1995, to approximately 13% of cases in FY1996, to over 17% of cases
in FY200. As to whether FY1995 or FY1996 data ought to be used as the benchmark to
measure the increase in departures after Koon, see supra note 15o.
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Supreme Court enunciated in Koon. That is, the Koon decision may have had
an impact on sentencings in various locales not by altering post-Koon appellate
case law, but by causing some sentencing judges and some advocates to
understand that the Supreme Court sought in Koon to make departures more
readily available. 6 3
More generally, we do well to recall that the year-by-year increase in
below-Guidelines sentences began well before Koon; that the continued
increase in noncooperation departures after Koon was accompanied by a
decrease in departures for cooperators;,64 and that throughout the 199os there
was an increase in the frequency of plea bargaining and guilty pleas.165
Moreover, average sentences fell throughout the 1990S.,66 It is clear, then, that
a host of norms and practices, involving both line prosecutors and judges, were
evolving throughout the decade and into the new century. 67 In light of the
complexity and the particularized nature of both charging and sentencing,
neither the raw data, nor the analyses of this data by the Commission in 2003
and Schanzenbach in 2005, allow us to infer the extent to which Koon was
responsible for the increase in noncooperation departures after that decision
was handed down. As Paul Hofer has observed: "[I]t appears that departure
rates were influenced ... more by cultural and institutional factors operating
163. Cf. Miller & Wright, supra note 157, at 793-800 (arguing that Koon changed the law on
departures).
164. See Figure i. It is possible that government-sponsored departures below the Guidelines and
judicial departures are in some circumstances a substitute for one another. For instance,
judges may be more disposed to find a ground for a below-Guidelines sentence in cases
where the Government does not initiate a basis for leniency from a severe Guidelines
sentence. See also Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569 (1998) (discussing why the District
of Connecticut consistently had a high rate of judicial departures and a low rate of
departures for cooperation, while the District of Massachusetts had a low rate of judicial
departures and a high rate of cooperation departures).
165. See supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
166. See U.S. SENT'G COMM., FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 90, at 46 (showing that average
sentences for felonies peaked in 1992 and fell slightly in every subsequent year of the
decade).
167. After examining factors that could explain the persistent decline in narcotics sentences
between 1991 and 1999, Bowman and Heise conclude that "at virtually every point in the
Guidelines sentencing process where prosecutors and judges can exercise discretionary
authority to reduce drug sentences, they have done so." Bowman & Heise, supra note 76, at
1126; see also Frank 0. Bowman, III and Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical
Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IowA L.
REv. 477, 558 (2002) (finding significant variation in drug sentence severity by circuit and
district, and concluding that "the decline in drug sentences has been largely a product of
discretionary choices by judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and probation officers").
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incrementally over the long term than by particular guideline amendments or
judicial decisions.' 68
Yet whatever their deficiencies as evidence of Koon's impact or evidence of
actual judicial sentencing behavior, 6, the numbers before Congress in 2003
were powerftil. They showed persistent increases in the rate of noncooperation
downward departures during the 199os-especially after the Koon decision was
handed down in 1996. This presented an opportunity for Congress, aided and
abetted by willing officials at Main Justice, 170 to demand an even greater
reduction in judicial discretion than had been achieved by the Sentencing
Guidelines. By 2001, the last year for which Congress had complete data, the
percentage of cases with noncooperation downward departures was greater
than that with departures for cooperators, 18% to 17%.' ' As one commentator
noted, "Prosecutors who don't like the increase [in departures] blame it on
activist judges emboldened by the 1996 Supreme Court decision United States
v. Koon.' 72 The Feeney Amendment would put a stop to this.
The Feeney Amendment was enacted into law on April 30, 2003, as part of
the PROTECT Act of 2003, the major provisions of which concerned child
pornography and other sexual exploitation of children. 73 Although the
Amendment was introduced by (and named after) Representative Tom Feeney,
a member of the House Judiciary Committee, which was at the time headed by
Representative Sensenbrenner, it reportedly was drafted by officials at the
Department of Justice. 74 In late 2002 and early 2003, the Department had
collected a set of seventy-eight white-collar cases from forty-nine districts
168. Paul J. Hofer, Immediate and Long-Term Effects of United States v. Booker: More Discretion,
More Disparity, or Better Reasoned Sentences?, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 425, 427 (20o6).
169. See supra Section II.B.
17o. Or perhaps it was Main Justice aided and abetted by a willing Congress. As discussed, it is
difficult to determine who was the "principal" and who was the "accomplice" in the
enactment of the Feeney Amendment. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (providing that all
accomplices are also principals).
171. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DowNwARD DEPARTURES, supra note lO6, at 32; U.S. SENT'G
COMM'N, 2001 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 94, at 51 fig.G.
172. Michael S. Gerber, Down with Discretion, LEGAL AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 72, 72, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2oo4/story-gerber-marparo4.msp.
173. Pub. L. No. lO8-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). See
generally Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial
Power To Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (2004).
174. See Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds-The Center
Doesn't, 117 YALE L.J. 1388 (2008).
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around the country in which sentencing judges had departed downward. 17s
According to spokesmen for Main Justice, these cases were egregious and
"troubling" examples of sentencing judges "using downward departures
frequently, in some cases nearly routinely, as a way of avoiding imposing the
prescribed guideline sentence. "1176 In testimony in March 2003 before the
Sentencing Commission, the Department announced it would "seek legislation
... to address the unacceptably high levels of non- [cooperation] downward
departures."'" Subsequent analysis showed that the Department's description
of the bases for departure in at least some of these seventy-eight cases was
incomplete or misleading, and that the government had not even sought to
appeal many of them.' 78 Inasmuch as local prosecutors' offices were the first
gatekeepers of appeals during these years (the Solicitor General's Office did not
even see cases that local prosecutors did not wish to appeal), 79 the showcasing
of this selected set of cases as evidence of judges abusing their limited
departure authority is consistent with the understanding that concern over
downward departures emanated not from line prosecutors in the field, but
from Main Justice and closely allied U.S. Attorneys.
Adopted as an amendment to the House version of the PROTECT Act, the
measure introduced by Representative Feeney would have prohibited all
downward judicial departures on grounds other than those specifically
provided in the Guidelines, as well as eliminated most remaining grounds
relating to the personal history or characteristics of the defendant, the very
175. A copy of the summaries of these seventy-eight cases, each on a separate page, has been
obtained by the author. The binder is entitled "Examples of Non-Substantial Assistance
Downward Departures in Economic Crimes," but does not list an author or a date.
176. Hearing on Commission's Response to Directives Contained in Sarbanes-Oxeley Act Before the
U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 7, 9 (2oo3) (statements of W. Mercer, U.S. Attorney, District of
Montana, and Paul K. Charlton, U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona). Mercer was
subsequently brought to Washington to serve concurrently as Principal Associate Deputy
Attorney General. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Deputy Attorney General James B.
Comey Announces Appointment of Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General (May 9,
2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2oo5/May/o5-dag-25o.htm. Interestingly,
several years after testifying before the Commission, Charlton was one of the seven U.S.
Attorneys dismissed on December 7, 2006. See Allegra Hartley, Timeline: How the U.S.
Attorneys Were Fired, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 21, 2007, http://www.usnews.com/
usnews/news/articles/o70321/21attorneys-timeline.htm.
177. Hearing on Commission's Response to Directives Contained in Sarbanes-Oxeley Act Before the
U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, supra note 176, at io.
178. See Letter from Julie Stewart, President, and Mary Price, Gen. Counsel, Families Against
Mandatory Minimums to Hon. Diana E. Murphy, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 4-9
(Aug. 1, 2003) (on file with author).
179. See supra note 102.
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grounds that Department officials had objected to in the set of seventy-eight
white-collar cases it had compiled and publicized.s The bill that ultimately
emerged from the House-Senate conference committee was less radical than
Feeney's original measure, in large part because both Senator Kennedy and
Senator Hatch (then the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee)
vigorously opposed the original proposal." ' Moreover, the Chief Justice of the
United States sent an extraordinary- if not unprecedented- letter, objecting
that the proposal would "seriously impair the ability of courts to impose just
and reasonable sentences."12 In the final bill, the nearly absolute prohibition
on judicial downward departures was limited to crimes involving child
pornography, sexual abuse, and child trafficking. 83 But the legislation
nonetheless contained a series of challenges to the then-extant regime of
federal sentencing. The Feeney legislation contained provisions that:
(1) Overturned the Supreme Court's holding in Koon, replacing the
existing standard for appellate review of departures of "abuse of
discretion" with "de novo" review by the court of appeals.184
(2) Increased direct prosecutorial control over departures in two
respects: first, by requiring the prosecutor's approval before a
sentencing judge could give the maximum available adjustment for
the defendant's acceptance of responsibility;' and, second, by
18o. Compare 149 CONG. REc. H24o5 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (providing the text of an
amendment to H.R. 1104 offered by Rep. Feeney, prohibiting downward sentencing
departures on the grounds of criminal history, family ties, diminished capacity, "aberrant"
behavior, vocational or educational skills, past good works, employment history, or mental
capacity), with Hearing on Commission's Response to Directives Contained in Sarbanes-Oxeley
ActBefore the U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 9 (2003) (statements of W. Mercer, U.S. Attorney, District
of Montana, and Paul K. Charlton, U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona) (decrying departures
for aberrant behavior, charitable or civic work, employment record, family ties, and mental
condition).
181. Gerber, supra note 172, at 74.
182. See Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 310 (2003) (quoting
Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Senator Patrick Leahy). Others also
objected, including the Judicial Conference of the United States, certain former U.S.
Attorneys, and a group of seventy law professors. See id. The author was a primary signatory
of the letter from law professors. See Letter from Professor Frank 0. Bowman et al. to
Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy (Apr. 2, 2003) (on file with author).
183. Pub. L. No. 108-21, S 4o1(b), 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (directly amending the Sentencing
Guidelines to prohibit or greatly limit departures in such cases).
184. Id. § 4 o1(d), 117 Stat. at 670; see Bibas, supra note 173, at 296. As to the meaning of de novo
review of fact-particularized sentencing departures, see infra note 202.
185. Pub. L. No. lO8-21, § 401(j)(2), 117 Star. at 671.
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prohibiting "fast-track" immigration-offense departures except on
motion of the prosecutor.'86
(3) Prohibited the Sentencing Commission, for a period of two years,
from providing new grounds for downward departures; directed
the Commission to amend the Guidelines so as to reduce the bases
and scope of currently available departures; 1 7 and reduced the
number of federal judges on the seven-member Commission from
"at least three" to "no more than three.' , 88
(4) Directed the Department of Justice to monitor and collect data on
all downward departures, and to issue guidance to prosecutors to
reduce the number of judicial departures and to ensure appeals
therefrom.8 9
Most portentously, the legislation as enacted required the Justice
Department to report all departures (including the name of the sentencing
judge) to Congress itself within fifieen days of the sentencing (that is, before time
had run on the Department's right to seek appeal). There was, however, an
important escape clause to this reporting requirement: it would not take effect
if, within ninety days of enactment of the Feeney Amendment, the Department
submitted a report to Congress setting forth procedures to ensure that
prosecutors would abide by the Guidelines and that the Department would
undertake the "vigorous pursuit of appropriate and meritorious appeals."' 9°
Feeney, in other words, directly confronted and sought to reduce the
discretion of every institution involved in federal criminal sentencing-the
Supreme Court, the courts of appeals, sentencing judges, the Sentencing
Commission, and even the Department of Justice. Both the Judicial Conference
of the United States, in September 2003, and Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, in his year-end report on the state of the judiciary, urged repeal of
186. Id. § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. at 675.
187. Id. §§ 401(m), 401(j)(2), 117 Stat. at 673, 675. Pursuant to this demand, the Commission
prohibited or restricted departures relating to overrepresentation of the defendant's criminal
history in the calculated criminal history score, aberrant behavior in drug trafficking
offenses or for repeat offenders, family ties, coercion and duress, diminished capacity,
addiction to gambling, restitution, role in the offense and acceptance of responsibility (the
latter two already calculated, to some extent, in the Guidelines). See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N,
DowNwARD DEPARTURES, supra note lO6, at 18-20 (summarizing and collecting Guidelines
citations). For a thorough analysis of the Commission's restrictions on departures in
response to Feeney, see 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 93-153 (2003).
188. Pub. L. No. 1o8-21, § 401(n)(1), 117 Stat. at 676.
i89. Id. § 401(l)(1) ,117 Stat. at 674.
19o. Id. 5§ 401(1)(2)(A), (1)(3), 117 Stat. at 675.
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portions of the legislation.191 To its credit, the Department had opposed the
direct reporting of sentences to Congress as "counter to longstanding and
important traditions that counsel against legislative interjection into individual
criminal cases."192 As noted above, however, the compromise that was then
reached-namely, that the Department take steps to ensure prosecutorial
compliance with the Guidelines and appeals from noncompliant judicial
decisions -conferred additional authority on the Department itself (that is,
Main Justice) at the expense of prosecutors in the field.
As required by the escape clause on reporting departures to Congress,
Attorney General Ashcroft issued a new Memorandum in July 2003 that, like
the Thornburgh Memorandum and Reno Memorandum before it,' 9 3 sought to
alter the behavior of individual prosecutors primarily by means of strict
charging policies that were mandatory on their face. In order to reduce the
incidence of fact bargaining, the July 2003 Ashcroft Memorandum not only
expressly employed that term-"federal prosecutors may not 'fact
bargain'" 94 -but went on to explain the meaning of this requirement in
practice: "[I]f readily provable facts are relevant to calculations under the
Sentencing Guidelines, the prosecutor must disclose them to the court,
including the Probation Office."195  In a September 2003 follow-up
memorandum, which explicitly superseded the Reno Memorandum, Attorney
General Ashcroft repeated the central requirement of both the earlier
directives- that "federal prosecutors must charge and pursue the most serious,
readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the
case" 196 - but listed fewer circumstances in which local offices would have
authority to deviate from this general rule absent the express approval of
Justice Department officials in Washington. The September 2003
191. See U.S. Judicial Conference Statement on the Feeney Amendment (Sept. 23, 2003),
reprinted in 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 136 (supporting legislation that would repeal portions of the
Feeney Amendment); Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 2003 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary (Jan. 1, 2004), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 143 (complaining, inter alia,
that "the PROTECT Act was enacted without any consideration of the views of the
Judiciary").
192. See Statement of Daniel P. Collins, supra note 152, at 331, 333.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
194. Memorandum from Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft 3 (July 28, 2003), reprinted in 15 FED. SENT'G
REP. 375, 376 (2003).
195. Id.
196. Memorandum from Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft 2 (Sept. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2oo3/September/o3-ag_16.htm.
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Memorandum of Attorney General Ashcroft repeated the strictures of his July
memorandum on "fact bargaining" and sentencing advocacy.
197
The immediate effectiveness of these statements of policy, no matter how
mandatory on their face and how few the expressly authorized exceptions,
depended on the incentives and attitudes of U.S. Attorneys and their line
prosecutors. No enforcement mechanism having been provided, and language
being what it is-for example, what is "readily provable"? -there was
operational and interpretive space in implementing these mandates. In any
event, as previously noted, there were not enough people in Main Justice to
monitor and enforce "mandatory" charging policies in every U.S. Attorney's
office. The mandatory-policy approach to controlling dispersed prosecutorial
discretion can work (if it can work at all) only by altering the practice and
norms of U.S. Attorneys' offices over time.
But in addition to these measures, the Ashcroft Memorandum of July 2003
introduced a new procedural device that might be enforceable by Main Justice
and that portended significant further centralization of authority in
Washington. That device was a new requirement that prosecutors report
"adverse" sentencing decisions to the Department in Washington.', 8 That is,
much as they had been required by Attorney General Ashcroft to report all
"death-eligible" cases to Main Justice (even when they did not wish to seek the
death penalty),' 99 every U.S. Attorney's office would now be required to report
all sentencings in which the judge made a Guidelines adjustment or downward
departure that "is not supported by the facts and the law."2"' Under the terms
of the new July 2003 directive, the Criminal Division of Main Justice, not the
local U.S. Attorney's offices, would have authority to decide whether to seek
approval from the Solicitor General's Office to appeal the case.2"'
In sum, Feeney directly limited the discretion of federal district judges,
ordered the Sentencing Commission to amend the Guidelines to reduce this
discretion further, increased the burdens on the federal courts of appeals
197. Id.
198. Ashcroft, supra note 195, at 4 ( "Department attorneys must promptly notify the appropriate
division at the Department of Justice ... concerning any adverse sentencing decision that
meets the objective criteria set forth in § 9-2.170(B) [of the U.S. Attorneys Manual as]
amended ... in the attached Appendix to this memorandum.").
19q. See supra note 112.
2oo. See Ashcroft, supra note 195, at 3, 4.
201. See id. at 3 ("[U]pon notification of an adverse decision described in [U.S. Attorneys'
Manual] § 9-2.170(B), the appropriate division at Main Justice should carefully review the
decision to determine whether an appeal would be appropriate and meritorious.").
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(which now had to review all sentencings "de novo"2°2), overturned a
unanimous Supreme Court decision, and impinged on the exercise of
discretion by line prosecutors. But it resulted, not coincidentally, in enhancing
the authority of the Department of Justice in Washington. Main Justice was
able to parlay congressional concerns about leniency in sentencing into further
centralization of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, thereby expanding its
own authority at the expense of that of the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys and
their line assistants. In the wake of Feeney (and in the wake of the threatened
investigation by Congressman Sensenbrenner of a judge who had expressed
concern over the severity of the Guidelines2"3), the number of true judicial
downward departures (those not initiated or otherwise sponsored by the
government) plunged to 5% of all cases,2 °4 as shown in Figure 2 above.
This was the state of affairs when the Supreme Court handed down Booker,
a decision that would fundamentally change federal sentencing. In restoring
the opportunity for judges in each of the nation's judicial districts to exercise
sentencing discretion, Booker struck back against the efforts of Congress and
the Justice Department to centralize both sentencing policy and the exercise of
prosecutorial power.
202. It is not clear exactly what was contemplated by Feeney's requirement that appellate courts
review all departures "de novo." Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New
York issued an order announcing that inasmuch as the "mandate of de novo review of
downward departures dictates that the Court of Appeals act in effect as a sentencing court,"
he would thereafter videotape all sentencing hearings, in order to aid the appellate court in
making credibility and other determinations. In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262, 264-65
(E.D.N.Y. 2004), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 282, 283-84 (2004).
203. See supra note 138. The consistent trending upward of the rate of noncooperation downward
departures reached its zenith in 2001. See supra note 137. Hence the reduction in the rate of
departures actually began shortly after Judge James Rosenbaum of the District of Minnesota
was targeted by Representative Sensenbrenner, and it is possible that this action had at least
as great an impact on sentencing judges as did Feeney itself. See also supra text
accompanying notes 164-168.
204. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2004 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 139, at 75
tbl.26A (showing that, pre-Blakely, the true judicial departure rate was 5.2%); id. at 281
tbl.26A (showing that, after Blakely was handed down on June 25, the true judicial departure
rate was 4.6%). Using the raw numbers provided in these tables, I calculated the overall true
judicial departure rate for FY2o04, which began on October 1, 2003, to have been 5%. In the
three months of FY2005 preceding the Booker decision, the true judicial departure rate was
even lower, 4.3%. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2007 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 132, at 63 fig.G.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S POWERS TO LIMIT PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
Throughout the years of the "mandatory" Guidelines, Congress had shown
no interest in addressing the phenomenon of greatly enhanced prosecutorial
influence over sentencing -which, I have argued,20 is in part a consequence of
Congress's own legislative actions, and specifically its disposition to write
broad, overlapping criminal prohibitions and to provide for severe maximum
penalties. While a few interested persons banded together to lobby against the
new regime-for instance, "Families Against Mandatory Minimums,,26 - and
decried the severe penalties imposed on those who found themselves charged
by federal prosecutors, opposition to the Guidelines regime did not have much
public salience, except in one area. The statutorily based requirement that
sentences for distribution of crack cocaine be significantly higher than those for
distribution of powdered cocaine had a pronounced and alarming disparity
based on race.2 °7 By the mid-199os, the Sentencing Commission had called for
adjustments to reduce these disparities, while no scholar or judge defended the
disparate sentencing."2 Yet every federal court of appeals upheld the
constitutionality of the crack-powder disparity 0 9 because the Supreme Court
205. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
2o6. See Jim Newton, Long LCD Prison Terms -It's All in the Packaging, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 1992,
at Ai.
207. See MARC MAUER, RACE To INCARCERATE 182-87 (1999) (describing the effect of
disproportionate incarcerations of African American communities); SENTENCING REFORM IN
OVERCROWDED TIMES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21-48 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen
Hatlestad eds., 1997) (describing racial disparities); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT:
RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995).
208. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 1 (1995); see also United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 n.2 (loth
Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring) ("[T]he lOO:1 crack/powder [weight] distinction
[is] virtually indefensible.").
2og. United States v. Moore, 54 F. 3 d 92 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting a challenge to provisions that
base sentences on the weight of drugs, with one gram of crack cocaine equivalent to loo
grams of powdered cocaine); United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cit. 1994) (same);
United States v. Smith, 34 F.3d 514 (7 th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Singleterry, 29
F. 3d 733 (ist Cit. 1994) (same); United States v. Thompson, 27 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(same); United States v. Thurmond, 7 F.3d 947 (loth Cit. 1993) (same); United States v.
Reece, 994 F.2d 277 (6th Cit. 1993) (same); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.
1992) (same); United States v. King, 972 F.2d 1259 (11th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v.
Harding, 971 F.2d 410 (9 th Cit. 1992) (same); United States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763 (8th
Cit. 1992) (same); United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895 (sth Cit. 1992) (same); United
States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Thomas, 9oo F.2d
37 (4 th Cit. 199o) (same).
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had made it abundantly clear that Congress has near-plenary authority to fix
criminal punishments.21
Indeed, the Supreme Court has taken a limited and "subconstitutional" role
in reviewing not just criminal penalties but nearly all of substantive criminal
law.2 ' It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the Supreme Court has
therefore played no role in checking legislative or prosecutorial overreaching. It
has done so primarily through two distinct approaches: first, and most
prominently, by creating or enlarging the constitutional procedural rights of
defendants; second, and less controversially, through its power to interpret
substantive federal criminal law and related common-law doctrines such as the
attorney-client privilege.
The criminal procedure "revolution" of the 196os is of course the most
sustained example of the former approach. Granting defendants additional
procedural rights (in either criminal investigations or trials) generally has the
effect of limiting or reducing the power of the prosecutor. Sometimes the
restraint on prosecutorial power is direct. The Batson case, 1 ' for instance, at
once provided the defendant a new right (the right not to have individual
members of the jury venire peremptorily struck on the basis of race) and placed
an explicit limitation on the exercise of peremptory challenges by prosecutors.
The limitation on the prosecutor is the flip-side of the right of the defendant.
In many situations, however, the limitation on the prosecutor's power is
indirect. For instance, Gideon"3 held that defendants who face imprisonment
have the right to counsel at trial. While this new entitlement did not directly
reduce prosecutorial authority, it did reduce the prosecutor's power relative to
that of indigent defendants. To use a metaphor, Gideon gave the defendant a
higher card in the poker game of plea bargaining with the prosecutor -and, all
other factors being equal, the expected result would be a more advantageous
outcome for the defendant, whether at trial or when plea bargaining in the
210. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991) ("Congress has the power to
define criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion."); cf.
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of a "three strikes"
law providing for up to life in prison, where the third "strike" was the theft of three golf
clubs).
211. See Kate Stith-Cabranes, Criminal Law and the Supreme Court: An Essay on the Jurisprudence
of Byron White, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 1523, 1548 (2003) ("[T]he Constitution places very few
limits on what a state may criminalize.").
212. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
213. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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"shadow" of the trial.2 14 There is no doubt that the process of plea negotiations
is complex and that the rationality of both defendants and prosecutors is
incomplete and bounded. 25 But as a general rule, it is reasonable to expect that
the recognition of additional defendant rights - the right to counsel, the right
to proof of every element beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to confront
witnesses, and so on-will redound, at least in the immediate aftermath, to the
benefit of defendants.2 6 This is why, after all, defense counsel urge the
Supreme Court to interpret Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment
rights expansively, while prosecutors generally resist such interpretations.
The Court initially declined the invitation to apply most of these rights in
the context of the Sentencing Guidelines. In the first decade of the Guidelines,
the Court deferred entirely to Congress and to the Sentencing Commission. In
1989, in Mistretta, it upheld the delegation of power to the Commission to (in
214. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 31-32 (1966); Thomas W.
Church, Jr., In Defense of "Bargain Justice," 13 LAw & Soc'F REv. 509, 512-14, 523 (1979);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309-17
(1983); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66-69
(1971); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Edward A. Ruttenburg, Plea Bargaining
Analytically- The Nash Solution to the Landes Model, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323, 353 (1979); Robert
E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, lOl YALE L.J. 1909 (1992); Robert
E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent
Defendants, iol YALE L.J. 2011 (1992). In the civil context, also see Robert Cooter, Stephen
Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic
Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); and Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and
Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
215. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2464
(2004); Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 512 (2007); Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency To Stand Trial in Preadjudicatory
Juveniles and Adults, 26 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 89, 96-97 (1998) (observing that
teenage defendants may lack the capacity to understand plea bargaining).
216. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Comment, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L.
REv. 295 (2001). Over time, changes in prosecutorial charging and other practices may blunt
the impact of the new procedural right. Moreover, the legislature usually has the power to
"undo" the leverage obtained by defendants by redefining crimes or punishments. See infra
note 329. See generally Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84
TEX. L. REv. 2055 (2006); Richman & Stuntz, supra note 4; William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 1O7 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
217. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 312 (2004) (Scalia, J.) ("The implausibility of
Justice Breyer's contention that Apprendi is unfair to criminal defendants is exposed by the
lineup of amici in this case. It is hard to believe that the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers was somehow duped into arguing for the wrong side.").
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effect) create "Guideline crimes" and rejected the claim that this power was
inappropriate for an agency purportedly in the judicial branch of the federal
government." ' Over the course of the next decade, the Court in four cases
rejected arguments that the Guidelines regime violated defendants'
constitutional procedural rights by (1) enhancing punishment on the basis of
criminal behavior of which the defendant was not convicted,1 9 (2) allowing
double punishment of behavior that both is the basis for a Guidelines
enhancement and is separately prosecuted,22 (3) requiring enhancement of
punishment on the basis of conduct ofCwhich the jury had acquitted the
defendant," and (4) requiring that punishment be based on "relevant
conduct" (the core of the Guidelines' "real offense" approach) of which the
defendant was not convicted.2 Only Justice Stevens, who a decade earlier had
raised constitutional objections to the enhancement of penalties on the basis of
unconvicted conduct,2 3 dissented in most of these cases."
In addition, the Court did not use its power to interpret federal law,
including application of the rule of lenity, to limit the reach of Guidelines
crimes. Although the Court had been willing to read mens rea requirements
into federal statutes that in fact had no mens rea language at all,"s it declined
to do so with respect to the Guidelines, which have a weak mens rea
requirement in vicariously attributing to the defendant the conduct of others
involved in the defendant's crime of conviction. 6 Indeed, in the early 199os,
the Court absolved itself of any responsibility to decide whether the
Commission had properly interpreted its various statutory mandates and
authorities, 1 7 granting the Commission a sort of super-Chevron deference
218. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
19. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993).
22o. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995).
221. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam).
222. Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998).
223. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. See supra note 74.
225. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
226. See, e.g., U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § 1B1.3 ("Relevant
Conduct" Guideline). For discussion of the Guidelines and mens rea, see United States v.
Richardson, 238 F.3 d 837, 840-41 (7th Cir. 2001); and Jack B. Weinstein & Fred A. Bernstein,
The Denigration of Mens Rea in Drug Sentencing, 7 FED. SENT'G REP. 121 (1994).
227. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993); Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193
(1992).
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despite the inapplicability to the Commission of the judicial review provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act.228
A. Booker: Recharging Judges and Prosecutors
The Supreme Court-without any change in its make-up-began to turn
the tide on the Guidelines in the late 1990S.29 We cannot know at a subjective
level why first three 3 ' and then four Justices23 1 joined Justice Stevens in
perceiving constitutional problems with a regime they had previously found
impervious to constitutional attack. Perhaps the continuing controversy over
crack-cocaine sentencing 32 -and the emerging controversy over the harsh
penalties imposed on corporations and their employees 233-played a part.
Guidelines sentences for both drug crimes and financial crimes depend heavily
on the quantity of harm found by the sentencing judge -specifically, the
quantity of drugs23 4 or the amount of financial "loss. " 23 s Both of these
228. See Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing a
Sentencing Agency in theJudicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REv. 217, 231 (2005).
229. For an examination of the Court's sentencing jurisprudence primarily from the "internal"
perspective of the decisions themselves, see Stith, supra note 70, which analyzes Blakely; and
Stith, supra note 30, which analyzes Mistretta and the Court's subsequent Guidelines cases.
23o. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 251 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined
by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, JJ.) (expressing "genuine[] doubt[]" that the "Constitution
permits a judge" to find facts that increase the maximum penalty).
231. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251 (1999) (expressing "serious constitutional" concern
if the statute is interpreted to permit sentence enhancement on the basis of judicial fact-
finding) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.).
232. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY (2002); U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1997); see also supra text accompanying notes 207-209.
233. See, e.g., Bryan Gruley & Keith Perine, Even Before Judge's Decision, Calls Build To Penalize
Microsoft, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1999, at Al; Deborah Lohse, Stratton Penalized in Crackdown
on Repeat Offenses, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1996, at B7F; see also Editorial, Enron Overstretch,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2005, at A16 (criticizing the Sentencing Guidelines for white-collar
crimes); Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Should the Stock Market Be the Sentencing Judge?, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 31, 2004, at A15 (criticizing the Sentencing Guidelines' "loss" calculations in
corporate fraud cases); George Melloan, The Supremes Touch the Brakes on CEO Bashing,
WALL ST. J., June 7, 2005, at A15 (lauding the Supreme Court's decision that overturned the
conviction of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm).
234. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § 2Di.l(c) (drug quantity table).
235. See, e.g., id. S 2B.i(b)(1) (detailing the offense level increase for financial crimes involving
varying quantities of loss). Moreover, whereas the drug quantity-penalty tables in the
Guidelines are at least extrapolated from corresponding amounts in federal statutes, the
Guidelines' "loss"-penalty tables appear to have been created out of whole cloth, without
1476
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quantities are calculated on the basis of the "real offense," and thus take into
account the actions of others for which the defendant is "accountable" through
operation of the Guidelines' "relevant conduct" provision.236 Their only mens
rea requirement is that the conduct be "foreseeable,"23 7 a low standard
generally frowned upon in the criminal law.238 But addressing this narrow issue
would have required the Court to overrule its previous assertion of deference to
the Commission in interpretation of its authority,239 and would have embroiled
the Court in an endless set of disputes over the meaning and basis for the
specific Guidelines crimes the Commission had chosen to create.
Instead of using its authority to interpret federal statutes, including the
Sentencing Reform Act, the Court ultimately reset the balance of authority in
federal sentencing through its power to enunciate the constitutional rights of
defendants. In a series of cases that culminated in United States v. Booker in
2005-from Jones (1999)' 4 0 and Apprendi (2000)"1 to Blakely (2004)14'-the
Court made it clear that a legislature or its delegate agency cannot evade the
rights that the Constitution guarantees-in the words of the Sixth
Amendment, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions" 3 - by moving part of the
"prosecution" to the post-conviction sentencing phase.
The Booker merits decision holding the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines
unconstitutional has been understood as a decision dealing with the Sixth
Amendment's right to jury trial. That is accurate but incomplete. It is true that
in Booker, the Court held that judicial fact-finding under the Guidelines
resulting in the enhancement of the maximum lawful sentence violates the
rights to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt guaranteed by the
either statutory or empirical basis. The great weight that the Guidelines attached to quantity
had been devastatingly criticized, see, e.g., United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d
416, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Lynch, J.), and nowhere explained, see STITH & CABRANES, supra
note 1, at 68-70.
236. See supra note 68.
237. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § 1B1.3 (a)(1)(B).
238. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 270-72 (4 th ed. 2003); see also id. at 688 (criticizing
the "'natural and probable consequence' rule of accomplice liability" as incompatible with
"fundamental principles of our system of criminal law").
239. See supra note 227.
240. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
241. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
242. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
243. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Fifth and Sixth Amendments.' It is also true that in Blakely v. Washington, the
decision that presaged the Booker merits holding, Justice Scalia proclaimed that
the trial jury "function[s] as circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of
justice. '"" In extolling the constitutional value of the jury, however, Justice
Scalia did not mean that the Blakely rule would actually result in more jury
trials. Indeed, the Justice recognized that the holding in Blakely would not
necessarily result in more trials at all. He went to great lengths to explain that
the structure of plea bargaining would not be altered: "[N]othing prevents a
defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights.... States may continue to offer
judicial fact-finding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead
guilty. '' , 6 He accepted that "[b]argaining already exists with regard to
sentencing factors because defendants can either stipulate or contest the facts
that make them applicable." 7 Thus the debate between Justice Scalia and
Justice Breyer in Blakely was not really about whether there should be greater
reliance on jury trials. 
8
Rather than being about "recharging the jury,"" the debate in Booker and
previous cases was about recharging the defendant by providing her with
additional rights that would, to some extent, counterbalance the power that the
prosecutor had gained under the Guidelines regime. This debate was framed
by widespread knowledge of the hegemony of federal prosecutors, and
increasingly Main Justice, over federal sentencing. In dissents in Blakely and
Booker, Justices Breyer and Sandra Day O'Connor insisted that sentencing
guidelines could ensure that prosecutorial power was not abused."' Justice
Scalia, on the other hand, showed no confidence in either the "juniorvarsity"2s'
Sentencing Commission or, for that matter, in sentencing judges."' Similarly,
in the Booker merits opinion, Justice Stevens for the majority stressed that his
244. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232 (Stevens, J.); see also id. at 319 n.6 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
245. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306.
246. Id. at 310.
247. Id. at 311.
248. Indeed, as Dan Richman notes, "the jury-in whose name this line of cases started, has
pretty much dropped out of the picture" in the 2007 trilogy of cases. Richman, supra note
174, at 1374.
249. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33 (2003).
250. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 331 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part); Blakely, 542 U.S. at
315-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
251. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 311-13.
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constitutional objection was not to the lack of jury trials under the Guidelines,
but to a system in which the defendant could not, in bargaining with the
prosecutor, have the power to insist on jury determination of sentencing
enhancement facts. The Justice was hardly seeking to "recharge" the jury when
he stressed that defendants could continue to plead guilty by "waiv[ing] [their]
Blakely rights."" 3 Indeed, Justice Stevens noted in his dissent on the remedy in
Booker, "[M]y proposed remedy ... would potentially affect only a fraction of
plea bargains .... 2 4
Had the Court in Booker adopted the remedy proposed by Justice Stevens,
as several states have done,"' the Guidelines would have been left in place as
"law," but Guidelines factors that result in enhancement of punishment would
have been charged alongside the statutory charges in the indictment. "Fact
bargaining" would have continued; indeed, more than a year after the Ashcroft
Memoranda had purported to outlaw it, s6 Justice Stevens noted that "fact
bargaining [is] quite common under the current system."2"7 The difference
would have been that that the prosecutor would have less bargaining power
because he could be "required to prove [sentencing facts] beyond a reasonable
doubt."2s In other words, the power of the prosecutor would have been
checked by the additional rights of the defendant, thereby providing additional
incentive to exercise her prosecutorial discretion by agreeing to a plea and
sentence bargain more favorable to the defendant. 9
Instead, the Booker Court unexpectedly adopted, in an opinion written by
Justice Breyer, a very different remedy to undo the unconstitutionality of
mandatory sentencing rules dependent on judicial fact-finding. This remedy
was to render the Guidelines "advisory" by "severing and excising" two
253. Booker, 543 U.S. at 285 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 289.
2ss. See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 n.17 (2007) (noting that eight states had
responded to Blakely by treating sentencing enhancement factors as elements of the crime,
subject to jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt should the defendant choose jury
trial).
256. See Memorandum from Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft 3 (July 28, 2003), reprinted in 15 FED.
SENT'G REP. 375, 376 (2003); Memorandum from Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft 5 (Sept. 22,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2oo3/September/o3-ag_516.htm; supra
text accompanying note 194.
257. Booker, 543 U.S. at 290 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 291.
259. I have elsewhere noted that under the Stevens resolution, "[n]o longer could the prosecutor
hold over the defendant's head the possibility of conviction at trial for some relatively easy-
to-prove crime, and then punishment under the Guidelines for additional or more serious
criminal conduct." Stith, supra note 30, at 489.
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provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act.26 ° One of these was the provision,
added by floor amendment to Senator Kennedy's reform legislation in 1978,
which made the Guidelines mandatory in all but factually extraordinary
cases.26" The second was the provision stating the standard of appellate review,
including the key provision of the Feeney Amendment that required "de novo"
review of sentencing departures by the courts of appeals. 62 Removing these
portions of the Sentencing Reform Act left as instructions to the sentencing
judge the general statutory criteria of the Sentencing Reform Act, as stated in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This provision requires the sentencing judge to "consider"
a variety of factors, including the nature of the offense, the purposes of
sentencing, and, importantly, the Guidelines' sentencing range and the
Guidelines' policy statements that discourage all but a few grounds of
departure. 63
It is a testament to Justice Breyer's inventiveness and his political skills that
the regime created by the Booker remedy decision in many respects resembles
the regime that the Booker merits decision held unconstitutional: factors that
enhance sentences under the Guidelines are not treated for constitutional
purposes as "Guidelines crimes" (with attendant rights of grand jury
indictment, jury trial, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt), and judges must
still calculate the Guidelines sentencing range as the starting point for every
sentence.
But it would misapprehend the achievements and significance of the Booker
remedy to view it simply as the last-ditch effort of Guidelines proponents to
save what they could of the old regime. While the Guidelines remain extant,
26o. Booker, 543 U.S. at 265.
261. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b)(1) (2000) (requiring sentencing judges to adhere to the Guidelines
unless they identify an "aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described [by the Guidelines,
including departure policy statements]"); see supra text accompanying note 23.
aa. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West Supp. 2oo7). The Breyer majority's stated rationale for this
unusual feat of severance was to abide by congressional intent, which was said to prefer an
"advisory" Guidelines scheme over the Stevens approach of retaining mandatory Guidelines
with engrafted constitutional requirements.
263. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). Curiously, and with uncertain effect, the excised portion of
§ 3553(b)(1) remains, after Booker, in the Commission's policy statement on grounds for
departure. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, § 5K2.o. In place
of the excised appellate review provision, the Court decided (and effectively amended the
Sentencing Reform Act to provide) that all sentences, whether or not departures, should be
reviewed by the courts of appeals using the standard of "reasonableness." See Booker, 543
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the remedy in Booker alters the status of the Guidelines significantly and opens
the possibility of an evolving sentencing law that draws on the judgment and
experience of sentencing judges themselves. Justice Breyer claimed in his
Booker remedy decision264 (as he had previously in dissenting opinions in the
Apprendi line) 6s that the Guidelines regime itself held this very promise. The
truth is that if the Guidelines did hold such a promise, it was never fulfilled.
Perhaps because the Sentencing Commission had to spend most of its time
responding to Congress's repeated demands for new and higher Guidelines
sentences, it did not attend in a sustained manner to the discontent expressed
by judges about particular Guidelines and Guidelines factors. While all but one
of the justices66 who supported the remedy in Booker apparently would have
preferred that the Apprendi/Blakely/Booker revolution had never taken place, the
creation of the Booker remedy is at least as revolutionary as the Stevens merits
decision-and in several ways more revolutionary than the Stevens remedy
would have been.
We do well to recall that the Stevens remedy, too, would have left the
Guidelines in place- and would have left them with the status of law. On this
issue, the Breyer remedy went a step further than any of Booker's advocates
before the Court had even dreamed or urged, 67 for it transformed the
Guidelines into something less than law. In so doing, it has the promise of
addressing and reducing the prosecutor's power over sentencing in every case.
It does so not by granting new rights to defendants, but by reviving the
approach that our legal system has relied upon throughout most of our
nation's history to check Congress's own nearly plenary authority to
criminalize and the prosecutor's nearly plenary discretion to charge -that is, by
reviving judicial discretion in sentencing. In other words, the Breyer approach
264. Booker, 543 U.S. at 250-52 (Breyer, J.).
265. See supra note 54.
266. Justice Ginsburg is the only Justice who joined both the Booker merits majority opinion (by
Justice Stevens), 543 U.S. at 226, and the remedy majority opinion (by Justice Breyer), 543
U.S. at 244.
267. Neither Booker's brief nor those of amici National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL) and the Federal Public Defenders urged the Court to transform the Guidelines
from mandatory to advisory. Nor did the brief for the United States even mention the
possibility of such a remedy in the event the Court held the Guidelines unconstitutional
under Apprendi and Blakely rules. Cf Kate Stith & William Stuntz, Sense and Sentencing,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A27 (urging, during the pendency of Booker in the Supreme
Court, that Congress could make the Federal Sentencing Guidelines constitutional under
the Apprendi and Blakely rules simply by making them advisory rather than mandatory).
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"recharged" the sentencing judge.268 The reinvigoration of the sentencing judge
was not itself a constitutional decision. None of the Justices in Booker was
prepared to deny Congress's constitutional authority to eliminate judicial
discretion by statutorily imposing the Stevens remedy, or by statutorily
altering the Guidelines to provide only for mandatory minimum (and not
maximum) sentences, or by statutorily imposing fixed sentences for all
crimes.26 9 Thus, the remedy in Booker was not constitutional but
"subconstitutional." This was the most the Court could do; the Rehnquist
Court was not likely to find in the Constitution itself a requirement of judicial
discretion in sentencing.
In addition to reducing the leverage of federal prosecutors by recharging
the sentencing judge, the Breyer remedy accomplishes several other important
recalibrations of the structure of federal sentencing that the Stevens remedy
would have left untouched. Booker did not just recharge the sentencing judge;
it also recharged local prosecutors, reined in Main Justice, and reduced the role
of the courts of appeals in sentencing by adopting a new standard for appellate
review- not just of departures from the Guidelines (as it had in Koon) but for
all sentences. In sum, Justice Breyer in Booker was able to undo every
significant provision of the Feeney Amendment.27 ° While Feeney overturned
Koon, Booker overturned Feeney, not only as to the Koon issue but as to each of
Feeney's most radical innovations. Booker explicitly excised from the
Sentencing Reform Act Feeney's "de novo" standard of review for departures
and adopted a new standard of "reasonableness" review for all sentences. It also
transmuted from "law" to "advice" all of the departure-reducing Guidelines
268. I use the term "recharge" here in contradistinction to the idea that these cases are about
"recharging" the jury. See supra note 249; cf. Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38
ARIz. ST. L.J. 387, 410 (2006) (arguing that Booker is "not really about vindicating the role of
juries and the meaning of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right, but rather about vindicating
the role ofjudges" (emphasis added)).
269. The Court was unanimous in recognizing Congress's power over the content of the criminal
law, including by providing for mandatory sentences. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226, 244; see also
infra note 329.
270. Feeney directly amended the departure Guidelines to prohibit certain grounds of departure
in child sex offenses, see PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. lO8-21, S 4o1(b), 117 Stat. 650, 668
(2003) (amending Guidelines 5Hi.6 and 512.13 and inserting new Guideline 5(2.22). But as
a result of Booker, these Feeney-added Guidelines now have only the "advisory" character of
all the Guidelines. In addition, Feeney added language to the Sentencing Reform Act itself
to greatly limit the availability of downward departures for child sex offenses. These
provisions remain in effect, since Booker did not excise or otherwise address them. 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(2) (West Supp. 2007). It is unclear whether Booker's excision of language
previously appearing in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West Supp. 2007), governing appellate
review, effectively renders even these Feeney provisions advisory.
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amendments that the Sentencing Commission had promulgated pursuant to
the Feeney Amendment.27  The post-Feeney Guidelines amendments
promulgated by the Commission, like the Guidelines as a whole, still exist, but
their legal status has been highly degraded. 7
Breyer's Booker remedy has also had the effect of altering the significance of
the 2003 Ashcroft Memoranda. Those directives, issued at the behest of and in
the wake of Feeney, placed strict limits on prosecutorial charge bargaining and
on sentencing fact bargaining, and sought to deny local prosecutors the power
to act as gatekeepers over which sentencing decisions would be appealed. 73 It
may well be that even after Booker, Main Justice is busy attempting to review
every sentencing decision that does not comport with the Guidelines. 74 But no
longer are such sentences ipso facto, in the words of the Ashcroft
Memorandum, "not supported by the facts and the law.""'
This change in the status of the Guidelines should give great pause to
efforts of Main Justice to control the local exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
When the Guidelines were fully "law," a requirement that the representative of
the government "oppose ''276 every downward adjustment and departure unless
clearly "supported by the facts and law" required the prosecutor to be a staunch
271. In response to Feeney, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to add a variety
of prohibitions and restrictions on departures. See supra note 187.
272. Many judges may still treat the Guidelines as "presumptive," in the sense that unless given
good reasons for doing otherwise, the judge will give a sentence that comports with the
Guidelines. But prior to Booker, the Guidelines were presumptive as a matter of law.
Moreover, if (following the usual convention, see supra note 26) one uses the term "the
Guidelines" to include the Commission's regulation of departures (which incorporated the
standard in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) that Booker excised), the Guidelines were, by law,
mandatory. Cf. Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV.
155, 156 (2005) (arguing that the change in label from "mandatory" to "advisory" is "jargon"
with little legal meaning).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 195-201.
274. Within a week of the decision in Booker, Main Justice issued a memorandum to all federal
prosecutors reiterating that "Federal prosecutors must actively seek sentences within the
range established by the Sentencing Guidelines in all but extraordinary cases ... involving
circumstances that were not contemplated by the Sentencing Commission." Memorandum
from Deputy Attorney Gen. James B. Comey to All Federal Prosecutors 2 (Jan. 28, 2005).
The memorandum also required prosecutors to seek approval for any appeal of below-
Guidelines sentence that "fails to reflect the purposes of sentencing." Id. at 2-3.
27S. See Ashcroft, supra note 195, at 2 ("The Department's actions with respect to sentencings
must in all respects be supported by the facts and the law.").
276. See id. at 3 ("Department attorneys must oppose sentencing adjustments ... that are not
supported by the facts and the law"); id. ("Prosecutors must affirmatively oppose
downward departures that are not supported by the facts and the law....").
HeinOnline -- 117 Yale L.J. 1483 2007-2008
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
advocate of the law itself. To abide by the Ashcroft Memorandum after Booker
puts the prosecutor in the position not of upholding the law, but of opposing
in all circumstances the exercise of lawful discretionary decisions of the
sentencing judge. The policies of the Ashcroft 2003 directives, if followed,
would require prosecutors to oppose, willy-nilly, below-Guidelines sentences
even when Guidelines sentences would clearly disserve the statutory purposes
invoked by Booker. The result would be a loss of credibility not only in the
proceeding at hand but also in cases where the prosecutors do have a winning
argument that the Guidelines sentence best serves the statutory purposes.
77
After Booker, what savvy or experienced prosecutors have always known should
be clear to every prosecutor: they must be responsive, formally and overtly, to
the judges before whom they stand -not simply to the Department in which
they are employed.
78
B. Booker Is for Real
It is understandable that Booker's remedial holding, recharging the
sentencing judge, was not clearly understood by most federal courts of appeals
until the trio of decisions in Rita, Kimbrough, and Gall. The precise legal weight
that the Court intended to give the Guidelines under the Booker regime was
described incompletely in that decision. If Booker's import was only to make
the Guidelines calculation "advisory," then as a formal matter the discretion of
sentencing judges would have been almost entirely restored to its pre-
Guidelines scope. While sentencing judges might be disposed to impose
Guidelines sentences, they would be under no legal obligation to do so. 279 A
277. Cf United States v. Herndon, No. 3:olCRooo63, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22277 (W.D. Va.,
Mar. 19, 20o8). The sentencing judge noted:
This district is reported to have the fourth largest number of defendants who
qualify for a reduction in sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Commission's
policy on retroactivity of the amended crack cocaine guidelines. Unfortunately, it
appears that the United States Attorney for this district is objecting to reduction
in every case .... [A] per se objection to reduction does not serve the public
interest.... [T]he court is required to consider the public safety in determining
whether to reduce a particular sentence ... and the government's blanket
objection in all cases does not assist the court in making that decision, and, in fact,
hinders it.
Id. at *1-*2 & n.i.
278. See also Richman, supra note 76, at 798.
279. Cf United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 304-05 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
plain effect of the remedial majority's decision" to make the Guidelines advisory "is to say,
117:1420 2oo8
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truly "advisory" system would give the Guidelines no more formal weight
than, say, the recommendations to judges made by the editorial writers of the
New York Times or the Wall Street Journal.28 °
But the Booker remedy did more than make the Guidelines "advisory." It
left in place one of the hallmarks (and worthy achievements)28, of the
Sentencing Reform Act: appellate review of sentencing. The duty of the courts
of appeals under the pre-Booker regime was to ensure that the sentencing judge
had complied with the Guidelines, including their limitations on judicial
departures from the calculated Guidelines sentencing range. After Feeney, the
appellate courts were also obliged to review departures "de novo," rather than
under Koon's abuse-of-discretion standard. Booker excised these statutory
provisions and created (essentially out of whole cloth) a new standard of
appellate review for all cases: appellate courts would be expected to determine
whether the sentence under review is "reasonable" given the statutory criteria
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), one of these criteria being the Guidelines themselves.
Appellate review for reasonableness does not make the Guidelines binding, but
it does make them - as opposed to, for instance, newspaper editorials - legally
meaningful."2'
How legally meaningful the Guidelines would be after Booker was not
clarified in that decision, perhaps because there was not agreement among the
five members of the Court who joined the remedial opinion. For the courts of
appeals, accustomed to their previous role as Guidelines enforcer, 8 3 the answer
was "very" meaningful. As one student of the Guidelines has noted, "In the
wake of Booker, federal courts of appeal did not rethink the goals of sentencing
from scratch. Instead, they continued to take the [G]uidelines seriously, much
district courts have discretion to sentence anywhere within the ranges authorized by
statute -much as they were generally able to do before the Guidelines came into being.").
280. Cf Editorial, The Limits of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMEs, April 16, 2008, at A24 (urging that
that capital punishment for rape of a child is unconstitutional; the case was being argued
that day in the U.S. Supreme Court); Editorial, Supreme Liability, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2007,
at A8 (expressing disappointment that in an amicus brief about to be filed in the Supreme
Court, the Solicitor General would probably support the concept of "secondary liability,"
characterized as being "all about. .. expanding the financial targets available for tort lawyers
to sue"); Editorial, 'Three Strikes' Strikes Out, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at A26 (expressing
agreement with the Ninth Circuit that the application of California's "three strikes"
sentencing law constituted "cruel and unusual" punishment of a defendant whose third
"strike" was a theft of videos worth $i5o; the case was being argued that day in the U.S.
Supreme Court).
281. See STITH &CABRANES, supra note 1, at 2, 170-71.
z8. See also Stith, supra note 30, at 491.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
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as they had for over twenty years. ''284 Indeed, seven of the twelve circuit courts
adopted a "presumption" of reasonableness for Guidelines sentences, while
four denied they applied such a presumption.s
Whether it is proper for a court of appeals to apply a rebuttable
presumption that Guidelines sentences are reasonable was the issue in Rita v.
United States, 86 the first case that the Court heard to clarify Booker. The briefs
submitted on behalf of the defendant highlighted the apparent gross disparity
between presumption-circuits and nonpresumption-circuits in the likelihood
of a defendant prevailing on appeal. Amici in Rita urged the Court not to allow
the Guidelines to be considered presumptively reasonable because courts of
appeals that had adopted a presumption never reversed a within-Guidelines
decision nor upheld a below-Guidelines decision appealed by the
government. s7 Amici argued, and Justice Souter ultimately agreed,"8' that
applying a reasonableness presumption to Guidelines decisions revives the
284. Richard M. Re, Re-Conceptualizing Booker: How To Prevent Legislatures from
Circumventing the Right to Jury Trial 52 (Mar. 7, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with The Yale Law Journal), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
-11o6543; see also Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENv. U. L. REV. 665, 676,
681-82 (2007).
285. Courts of appeals explicitly adopted a presumption of reasonableness for Guidelines
sentences in United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir. 20o6), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 691 (20o6); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053-1054 (ioth Cir. 20o6); United
States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 20o6), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1156 (20o6); United
States v. Williams, 436 F.3 d 7o6, 708 (6th Cir. 20o6), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3043 (2007);
United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415
F.3 d 6o6, 6o8 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. io8i (2oo5). Four courts of appeals declined to adopt a presumption of
reasonableness but nonetheless indicated that a within-Guidelines sentence would seldom
be unreasonable. See United States v. Jim~nez-Beltre, 44o F.3 d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (en
banc), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 928 (2007); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir.
20o6), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 192 (20o6); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3 d Cir.
2006); United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (1ith Cir. 2005).
286. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
287. Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, at 3-5, Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754). Prior to the
Court's grant of certiorari in Rita, there was no appellate decision reversing a within-
Guidelines sentence. During the pendency of Rita, one such decision was handed down. See
United States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2006). The author is aware of only one
other decision holding a within-Guidelines sentence unreasonable. See United States v.
Paul, 239 Fed. App'x 353 (9 th Cir. 2007).
288. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2487 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Guidelines to such an extent that the system would threaten once again to
violate the Constitution.289
Yet as noted above,290 appellate sentencing case law is a poor indicator of
how the law is actually applied in the district courts. This is not surprising in
view of the Justice Department's ability strategically to decline to appeal most
below-Guidelines sentences. (Indeed, the Government's brief in Rita ever-so-
nimbly conceded as much.2 91) As a subsequent empirical analysis
demonstrated, the appellate adoption of a presumption of reasonableness after
Booker reduced the national frequency of a below-Guidelines sentence by only
%- and that result was solely attributable to the Second Circuit (comprising
the judicial districts of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont), which had long
been the most departure-friendly of all circuits.292 The inconsequential impact
of an appellate presumption of Guidelines reasonableness was dwarfed by the
apparent impact of Booker itself. The raw sentencing data, not controlled for
caseload or other factors, show a marked increase in non-government
sponsored below-Guidelines sentences (from 5% of all sentences to
approximately 12% of all sentences).293 The practical insignificance of the
appellate presumption was matched by the doctrinal ambiguity of the holding
z8g. See Brief for New York Council of Defense Lawyers, supra note 287, at 5a-6a; Brief for the
Federal Public and Community Defenders and the National Association of Federal
Defenders in Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at All-Ai7, Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (No.
06-5754).
ago. See supra Section II.A.
291. See Brief for the United States at 36, Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (No. 06-5754) (stating "the reality
[is] that ... the government does not reflexively appeal whenever there is a below-
Guidelines sentence," and noting that the government had appealed only 2% of below-
Guidelines sentences since Booker).
292. Alexander P. Robbins & Lynda Lao, The Effect of Presumptions: An Empirical Examination of
Inter-Circuit Sentencing Disparities After United States v. Booker (Nov. 4, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027541. Taking out the Second Circuit,
the presence of a circuit presumption of Guidelines reasonableness actually increased the
frequency of below-Guidelines sentences. See also Paul J. Hofer, Empirical Questions and
Evidence in Rita v. United States, 85 DENy. U. L. REv. 27 (2007) (discussing the ambiguity of
post-Booker sentencing data).
293. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, BOOKER FINAL REPORT, supra note 135, at 55, fig.2, D-io (showing
that the percentage of cases with non-government sponsored below-Guidelines sentences
increased from 5.2% in the first half of FY2o04 to 12.5% in the first year after Booker was
handed down); U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2007 SENTENCING STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 132, at 50 tbl.N, 63 fig.G (showing that the percentage of cases with non-government
sponsored below-Guidelines sentences grew from approximately 50/o in FY2004 to 12.1% in
both FY20o6 and FY2007); see also supra note 204 (calculating the percentage of such
sentences in FY2o04 to have been exactly 5%, and noting that the percentage in FY2005,
pre-Booker, was even lower).
HeinOnline -- 117 Yale L.J. 1487 2007-2008
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in Rita: that courts of appeals are permitted, but not required, to apply a
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences.294
The most important institutional message of Rita was that it signaled the
Supreme Court's willingness to continue to tolerate significant variances in the
rate of below-Guidelines sentences in the various circuits, 29 ' despite Booker's
extended discussion of Congress's desire for national uniformity.9 6
In addition, Justice Breyer's opinion in Rita, joined in full by five other
Justices (including Justices Ginsburg and Stevens), gave a special nod to
sentencing judges, which had not appeared in Booker. According to Rita, the
reason a court of appeals is allowed to decide that within-Guidelines sentences
warrant a reasonableness presumption is that such sentences represent a dual
judgment: the Sentencing Commission's considered judgment and that of the
sentencing judge that such a sentence is appropriate given the facts of the
case.297 Before Booker, the Sentencing Commission was the body that formally
enunciated sentencing policy; the views of judges on sentencing policy would
be heard, if at all, only as filtered through the Commission, which might (or
might not) consider their views and amend the Guidelines as appropriate in an
"evolutionary" process.29 s Booker as elaborated in Rita clearly shifts power away
from the Commission, according the judgments of sentencing judges direct
significance in each criminal sentencing proceeding.
294. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2459.
295. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, BOOKER FINAL REPORT, supra note 135, at 98-104 (showing
marked variance in rates of Guidelines sentences and various types of non-Guidelines
sentences among the eleven circuits and among the ninety-four districts, as had been true
pre-Booker).
296. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 255-56 (2005).
297. 127 S. Ct. at 2463 ("[T]he presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is
considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the
Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in
the particular case. That double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the
sentence is a reasonable one."). One sentencing scholar has astutely noted that "Rita's
'double determination' logic necessitates that the sentencing court's determination be truly
independent of the commission's determination as expressed in the [G]uidelines.
Otherwise, there would be no double determination, but only one determination followed
by an echo." Re, supra note 284, at 58-59.
298. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 20, at 2 (providing the original
introduction for the Guidelines Manual as an editorial note to commentary to § iAi.s) ("The
Commission emphasizes, however, that it views the guideline-writing process as
evolutionary. It expects, and the governing statute anticipates, that continuing research,
experience, and analysis will result in modifications and revisions to the guidelines .... ").
This original introduction to the Guidelines Manual, said to be written by Judge Breyer, see
text accompanying supra note 49, was moved to an "application principle" in 2000.
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Moreover, in a series of dicta, Rita seemed to invite sentencing judges to
consider whether the Sentencing Commission had in fact made a "professional
judgment" 99 with respect to the factors at hand. In language that perhaps was
necessary to win the concurring votes of the Justices who most strongly adhere
to the proposition that only truly "advisory" Guidelines are constitutionally
permissible, ° ° Justice Breyer noted the possibility that the Guidelines
themselves could "reflect an unsound judgment, or ... they do not generally
treat certain defendant characteristics in the proper way." 0 ' Rita thus implicitly
suggested that the Sentencing Commission, which at one time was worthy of
super-Chevron deference,30 2  now merits only the lesser deference of
Skidmore.3"3
The Court's two Guidelines decisions handed down early in the October
Term 2007, Gall v. United States"4 and Kimbrough v. United States,30 take these
suggestions further. Going beyond Booker, they explicitly affirm the important
role of the sentencing judge, not simply in finding facts that the Guidelines
provide are relevant to punishment, but in judging the statutory purposes of
sentencing, including the justness of punishment in the case at hand. The
majority opinion in Gall by Justice Stevens expressly rejects the circuit case law
that the greater the magnitude of departure from the Guidelines, the more
"extraordinary" must be the circumstances justifying departure.3" 6 The opinion
likewise rejects any application of "a presumption of unreasonableness" to non-
Guidelines sentences.30 7 The decision exhorts sentencing courts to judge for
299. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468.
300. This language would appear to be especially important to Justice Ginsburg, see Cunningham
v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.), and to Justice Scalia, see Gall v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 602 (Scalia, J., concurring) (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 303 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
301. 127 S. Ct. at 2468.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 227-228.
303. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."); cf. Stith & Dunn, supra note
228, at 231-33 (arguing in favor of establishing a new sentencing agency not accorded
Chevron deference).
304. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
305. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
3o6. 128 S. Ct. at 595.
307. Id. Rita, while allowing the courts of appeals to apply a presumption of reasonableness to
Guidelines sentences, had strongly hinted that it would be impermissible to apply a
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themselves the statutory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); the district
court "may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable" and "must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.30
8
To be sure, these two opinions do not on their face allow sentencing judges
anything close to the full range of discretion they could exercise in the pre-
Guidelines era. Most significantly, the Court in Kimbrough continued to stress,
as the Court often has done since Mistretta, the Sentencing Commission's
asserted expertise and reasoned policy judgments -judgments that in most
cases sentencing judges apparently should award significant deference. Justice
Ginsburg's majority opinion in Kimbrough made clear that the particular issue
presented in that case-the disparity in sentencing rules governing crack
cocaine and powdered cocaine-is an example of a situation in which a
sentencing judge could reasonably conclude that the Guidelines themselves
"reflect an unsound judgment," in the words of Rita,3 9 and "fail[] properly to
reflect the § 3553(a) considerations," in the words of Kimbrough31 ° At the same
time, however, Justice Ginsburg's opinion, perhaps to ensure Justice Breyer's
full concurrence, repeats the bromide of the "empirical basis" of the
Guidelines - except, apparently, for drug offenses. In constructing its
Guidelines for offenses involving the distribution of cocaine and other
narcotics, the Commission had accepted and built upon the differential
mandatory minimums and maximums in statutory law. 311 As portrayed in
Kimbrough, the Commission's acquiescence to the will of Congress was an
exception to its normal, scientific mode of operation. In the words of the
opinion, the Guidelines on crack cocaine "do not exemplify the Commission's
exercise of its characteristic institutional role," which is to take account of
"empirical data and national experience."3I 2
This paean to the Sentencing Commission echoes the repeated claims of
Justice Breyer. Most recently in Rita, he asserted that the Guidelines were
based on an "empirical approach" and reflected, on average, past sentencing
presumption of unreasonableness to sentences outside the Guidelines. See Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2467 (2007).
308. Id. at 596-97.
309. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007).
310. 128 S. Ct. at 570.
311. Id. at 575; see supra note 209. See generally Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017,
1046 (2004) ("[T]he Guidelines themselves often reflect ... mandatory minimum
sentences. The Guidelines for drug trafficking, for example, are pegged to the mandatory
minimum drug quantities.").
312. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575.
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practice as revealed by a statistical analysis of io,ooo pre-Guidelines
presentence reports.3"3 This has always been a puzzling claim. When the
original Guidelines were constructed, there were no available data in most
presentence reports with respect to many of the factors that the Sentencing
Commission decided were most relevant to a sentence; nor did the
Commission seek to determine what factors the sentencing judges in the
sample of 1o,ooo cases actually considered in imposing sentence. Moreover,
largely pursuant to broad statutory directives in the Sentencing Reform Act
itself, the Commission provided for significant increases in sentences for major
categories of crime, including white-collar offenses.31 4 Most importantly, as the
insightful Paul Hofer recently noted, "A lot has happened since Justice Breyer
left the Sentencing Commission."3"'  The most important thing that
"happened" are hundreds of amendments to the original Guidelines, most of
which increase penalties at the express direction of Congress, including Feeney
and, in the white-collar area, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.' 6
The doctrinal and practical implications of Kimbrough are thus uncertain
and, frankly, baffling. Most curiously, the opinion suggests that implementing
the will of Congress is the exception for the Commission, and that where the
Commission is merely responding to the requests or mandates of Congress,
sentencing judges have freedom to disagree with the policy judgments
313. 127 S. Ct. at 2464.
314. For accounts of the limitations of the empirical analyses undertaken by the Sentencing
Commission, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 6o-61; Amy Baron-Evans, The
Continuing Struggle for Just, Effective, and Constitutional Sentences After United States v.
Booker: Why and How the Guidelines Do Not Comply with 5 3553(a), 30 CHAMPION 32 (2006);
Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, ii FED. SENT'G. REP. 18o, 182 (1999);
and Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of Federal Criminal Sentencing Policy;
Or, Confessions of Two Reformed Reformers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1001 (2001).
315. Hofer, supra note 292, at 47.
316. The Feeney Amendment directly amended the Guidelines, see Pub. L. No. io8-21, § 4o1(b),
(g), (i), 117 Star. 668, 671-72 (2003), and directed the Commission to amend them further,
see supra text accompanying note 187. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 805,
116 Stat. 745, 802 (2002) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note), also directed the
Commission to amend the guidelines, see Scott L. Fenstermaker, Amendments to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines After Sarbanes-Oxley, 21 J. TAX'N INVEST. 17 (2003). But these are
only among the most recent and prominent instances of Congress directing the
Commission's work. Since the original Guidelines were promulgated in 1987, the
Commission has amended them on more than 700 occasions, usually directly in response to
legislation that added new crimes or altered the punishments of existing crimes, and that
often explicitly mandated amendment of the Guidelines. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, FIFTEEN
YEAR REPORT, supra note 9o, at B1-B9 (listing "Congressional Directives to the United
States Sentencing Commission Subsequent to Enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act");
Hofer, supra note 292, at n.115.
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embedded in the Guidelines. Where, on the other hand, the Guidelines
represent "empirical analysis," judges are generally not free to disagree with the
policy judgments they embody.1 7 In fact, most Guidelines (including the
original Guidelines) cannot be said in any meaningful sense to be based on
empirical analysis, but do reflect the will of Congress as clearly stated in the
Sentencing Reform Act and in Congress's hundreds of subsequent instructions
to the Commission.' Of course, reflecting the will of Congress is ordinarily a
basis for judicial deference to administrative regulations.
If fairly described here, Kimbrough may, in the final analysis, be far less
significant than Gall. The crack-cocaine Guidelines present a unique situation
in which the Commission itself respectfully questioned the wisdom of
Congress, while faithfully adhering to Congress's judgments until just after the
Court granted certiorari in Kimbrough. Indeed, as the Court noted, it was
during the pendency of Kimbrough that the Commission amended its crack-
cocaine Guidelines to reduce the Guidelines' disparate treatment of the two
forms of cocaine."' It is possible that as a doctrinal matter, Kimbrough will
stand merely for the proposition that judges may reject Guidelines based on
statutory determinations where the Commission itself has rejected the
reasonableness of those determinations- a principle that, so far, is limited to
sentences for distribution of crack cocaine. Kimbrough has the potential,
however, to permit, at last, something akin to administrative judicial review of
the Sentencing Guidelines.32° Given its broadest reading, the decision may
stand for the proposition that sentencing judges have discretion to reject
Guidelines that the Commission has never explained or justified.32 '
Still, the resounding overall message of Rita, Kimbrough, and Gall is clear:
Booker did indeed transform the Federal Sentencing Guidelines from "law" to a
lesser species, a form of quasi-law. Using the Court's terminology, the
Guidelines are "advice" that yield sentences that (per Rita) can in most cases be
judged "reasonable." Inasmuch as Booker tells the courts of appeals to review
sentences under a "reasonableness" standard, a Guidelines sentence is as safe as
any harbor can be. But reasonableness has a range and can take more than one
form. Most importantly, the courts of appeals may not pronounce a sentence
317. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 314-316.
319. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 566 n.6, 569, 573.
320. See supra text accompanying note 228.
321. See Paul J. Hofer & Amy Baron-Evans, New Frameworks for Federal Sentencing 19 (Apr. 22,
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unreasonable simply because the reviewing panel would have imposed a
different sentence had it been the sentencing court. Gall confirms that if a
sentencing judge explains the reasons for her judgment that the § 3553(a)
factors warrant a non-Guidelines sentence, the reviewing court must adopt a
posture of "deference" to the "reasonableness" of her passage outside the safe
harbor.322 Indeed, Gall interchangeably uses the term "reasonableness" and
"abuse of discretion" as the standard for appellate review of all sentences. 323
While "abuse of discretion" meant review for legal error when the Guidelines
(including their regulation of departures) were law,314 under the Booker regime
the standard of abuse of discretion requires deference to the sentencing judge's
decision to give a non-Guidelines sentence.
As suggested above, restoring significant sentencing power (and thus
opportunity to exercise informed discretion) to sentencing judges throughout
the nation weakens the centralizing role of the Sentencing Commission and
Main Justice, the institutions whose objective has been to capture authority
over sentencing. Empowering the sentencing judge also empowers the
litigants, including the line prosecutor. They must respond to the individual
sentencing judge's understanding of the demands of justice, which
deemphasizes, and in many cases may override, whatever hollow directives
continue to emanate from the central, bureaucratic authorities in Washington,
D.C.
Less than a decade ago, federal district judges occupied a position of
weakness and disrespect in the nation's criminal sentencing system. Now their
sentencing judgments must be accorded deference. Indeed, the new discretion
handed to federal sentencing judges has already led one distinguished judge in
the Southern District of New York consciously to echo a concern that a
predecessor on that court, Marvin Frankel, expressed thirty-five years ago32 :
"Before the cheering starts among district judges, let me [urge that] .... [j]ust
as 'sentencing guidelines' are misnamed when they are treated as narrowly
322. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007) ("But if the sentence is outside the
Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness. It may
consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district court's
decision that the S 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.").
323. See id. at 591, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 600, 602. Kimbrough also uses the two terms
interchangeably. See 128 S. Ct. at 575, 576.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 156-s58.
325. See FRANKEL, supra note 2.
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rigid binding rules, so are they misnamed when they cease to guide anyone. 32 6
And so the pendulum swings.
CONCLUSION
The "Guidelines" promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission under
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 were no mere guidelines; from the
beginning, they were mandatory rules for sentencing. The most significant
consequence of the Sentencing Reform Act was the transfer of power over
punishment from judges to line prosecutors and the Department that employs
them. In the wake of the 2003 Feeney Amendment, the Guidelines became
more rigid as judicial discretion was further squeezed out of the system, and as
prosecutorial discretion became more severely constrained under policies of
Main Justice that sought to centralize control over prosecutorial charging and
plea decisions. While data on Guidelines application and on departures do not
reveal the actual workings of the law on the ground, examination of data over
time can reveal trends. The trend after Feeney was a free-fall in judicial (non-
government sponsored) departure rates, to only 5% of all cases in 2004.3"7 This
was the lowest level since the earliest years of the Guidelines. However, 2004
was also the year that the Court decided Blakely, which foretold the
unconstitutionality of the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, as decreed the
next year in Booker.
And so, the Supreme Court has for now prevailed-with Justice Breyer
both a (reluctant) hero and a "winner." The Booker remedy managed to save
the Guidelines (albeit as a still-evolving species of highly degraded law), while
simultaneously allowing greater exercise of judicial discretion, as former
Sentencing Commissioner Breyer apparently had always preferred. Most
importantly, both in holding the Guidelines unconstitutional and in
constructing the Booker remedy, the Court as a whole asserted the authority of
the Judicial Branch in the face of both a Congress and an Executive Branch that
had failed to accord it adequate respect.
Booker's assertion of authority was not just on behalf of district judges; it
was for the federal judiciary as a whole -and most saliently for the Supreme
Court itself, whose unanimous decision in Koon had been undone cavalierly by
the Feeney Amendment. Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough also make clear that Booker
empowers both defendants and line prosecutors - not directly, but by
326 Gerard E. Lynch, Letting Guidelines Be Guidelines (and Judges Be Judges), OSJCL Amici:
Views from the Field 1-2 (20o8), htrp://osjcl.blogspot.com.
327. See supra note 204.
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permitting these adversarial parties in a criminal case to present reasons to a
judge for tempering implementation of the Sentencing Commission's policies.
At a minimum, the Court has to some extent restored discretion, localized in
judges and prosecutors in the ninety-four federal districts of the nation.
There is a nice irony in the fact that the counter-revolution of Booker and its
progeny, which revives the discretion of district judges and local prosecutors, is
a direct result of "real offense" sentencing- the very approach that, at the dawn
of the Guidelines era, the Sentencing Commission had adopted to directly
reduce the power of judges and indirectly reduce the power of prosecutors over
criminal punishment.32 The Booker merits decision held that mandatory "real
offense" sentencing is unconstitutional, and Booker's remedy restoring
significant opportunities for the exercise of judicial discretion indirectly
liberates line prosecutors from a regime in which fidelity to the law required
that they seek the most severe "real offense" sentence available.
While Congress has the constitutional authority to undo both halves of the
Booker decision, 29 it appears for the moment to have moved on to other
concerns. Crime is down. Issues of executive power, rather than judicial power,
are at the fore. After its brief burst of energy in Feeney, Congress seems to have
become bored with criminal sentencing. That issue has been largely kicked
back to the federal district courts, where it resided for two centuries, essentially
ignored by Congress, Main Justice, and the people themselves. The abject fear
of judging has abated considerably.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 44-61.
329. In Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), the Supreme Court declined to apply the
Apprendi rule to judicial fact-finding that increases the minimum, rather than maximum,
sentence. This leaves an opening for Congress to reinstate the Booker-excised portions of the
Sentencing Reform Act, see supra notes 261-262, without violating the Constitution. If
Harris remains good law, all Congress need do is alter the structure of the Guidelines to
provide only mandatory minimum sentences (with the maximum lawful sentence always
being the statutory maximum for the crime of conviction). See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train
Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal ofBlakely v.
Washington, 41 AM. CRim. L. REV. 217, 262-63 (2004).
Apparently only Justice Scalia, who was in the majority in both Harris and the Apprendi
line of cases, is able to reconcile the two; hence, the continued viability of Harris remains
uncertain. But even if the Court should overturn Harris, Congress has the constitutional
power to restore a mandatory sentencing guidelines system. It could respond, for instance,
by instructing the Sentencing Commission to alter the structure of the Guidelines to provide
for high base sentences and to treat the absence of aggravating factors as "mitigating"
factors. Apprendi and its progeny only prohibit judicial fact-finding that increases sentences;
there is no constitutional prohibition on judges reducing sentences on the basis of
mitigating factors designated by statute or administrative rules.
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To be sure, we have not come anywhere near full circle. There are still
powerfiil forces arrayed against the exercise of sentencing discretion by district
judges responsive to local concerns, the particular facts of the case at hand, and
the advocacy of the parties. As a formal matter, courts of appeals may still
second-guess judges whose sentences are found to be an "unreasonable"
application of the broad statutory sentencing criteria that are the lodestar of
sentencing law after Booker. At a more practical level, Main Justice may,
through those U.S. Attorneys and line prosecutors who yield with ease to its
centralizing directives, meet and parry every move judges make to judge
outside the Guidelines.33 Most importantly, the Guidelines remain the starting
point for all sentences, with an anchoring effect331 made all the more powerful
by Rita's go-ahead to the courts of appeals to treat Guidelines sentences as
presumptively reasonable.332 The Guidelines are now the frame, in both law
and practice, in which sentences are viewed.333
If it should come to pass that only the Guidelines, and not local judgments
outside of the Guidelines, are hereafter considered "reasonable," we could not
fairly ascribe that result to a decree from on high. Booker loosed the weight of
law that compelled the whole federal criminal justice system to profess to
comply with the arbitrary metrics of the Guidelines. Even without the force of
law, however, the gravitational pull of the Guidelines on the pendulum of
sentencing practice remains strong. It is possible that as a new generation of
330. See, e.g., supra note 277.
331. Cf Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences:
The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts' Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 188, 194 (20o6), available at http://psp.sagepub.com/cgVcontent/
abstract/32/2/188 (finding that in an experimental setting, the sentence imposed varied with
the severity of the initial recommended sentence, even though those pronouncing sentence
knew that the initial recommendation was chosen at random).
332. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2487 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
333. Slightly more than 9o% of active federal district judges were appointed after the Guidelines
became effective; even including senior district judges, more than two-thirds were
appointed during the Guidelines regime. See Federal Judicial Center, Federal Judges
Biographical Database, www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (last visited Mar. 31, 20o8) (search
for judges confirmed after November 1, 1987, the date on which the Guidelines became
effective). See generally Jack B. Weinstein, The Role ofJudges in a Government Of, By, and For
the People, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 20o8) (manuscript at 287, on file with
author) ("The judiciary's hesitancy to depart from the Guidelines with any frequency [post-
Booker] is not surprising when one considers that ... [m]ost federal trial judges have never
sentenced under any other program, ... such sentencing requires less time in thought and
less stress on the judge than fashioning individual sentences [and] ... judges may also be
exercising self-restraint out of apprehension about possible action by Congress that would
reinstate a mandatory system.").
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prosecutors and judges enters into service, the pendulum may swing back
toward the local exercise of informed discretion, if Booker lasts that long. But
incumbent sentencing decision makers may be reluctant to regard as
unreasonable the sentences they were obliged to seek and impose for two
decades under the command and the conceit of law.
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